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Japan has uncovered a competitive advantage in murder 
prevention strategies, as murder rates in the nation are some of the 
lowest in the world.  In Japan, murder rates have been falling 
consistently since the post-World War II era to reach rates of 0.2 
murders per 100,000 people, whereas in the United States these rates 
have been historically volatile, stabilizing in recent decades slightly 
above 5 murders per 100,000 people.  This study poses the following 
questions: What structural, sociolegal, and policy elements have 
made Japan reach such positive results in murder prevention?  And 
what lessons can be learned from this success that may help reduce 
murder rates in the United States?  Analyzing the state of murder in 
Japan and the United States, this Paper provides a comparative 
examination of some of the structural factors affecting the 
geographical and perpetrator elements of murder.  Through the lens 
of (i) socioeconomic indicators like inequality, poverty, and 
unemployment, as well as (ii) the geographical allocation of police 
resources (comparing the United States police infrastructural 
arrangement with the Japanese koban system), this Paper attempts 
to shine light on the structural patterns that have made Japanese 
society such a profoundly safe environment from homicide.  
Avoiding purely holistic or monolithic culturalist arguments, the 
Paper looks at the historical trajectory of murder at a national level, 
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then provides a contemporary state of murder analysis of Boston as 
compared to Osaka, and New York in contrast to Tokyo.  Dispelling 
the notion that a larger police force with larger capital investment 
equates safety from murder, the study finds that (i) areal 
socioeconomic integration, and (ii) equal geographic distribution of 
police resources as community-focused and integrated safety 
providers, are two of the foundational distinct elements that lead to 
murder prevention in Japan—and that a tailored adaptation of this 
system to the United States’ needs, capabilities, and characteristics 
could signify increased efficiency in murder prevention, and a 
consequent reduction in murder rates. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Japan’s murder rates have been consistently falling since World 
War II, to the point that the Land of the Rising Sun is one of the safest 
countries in the world, with some of the lowest murder rates.1  This 
raises a number of compelling legal and policy questions: Why are 
there so few murders in Japan?  What are the legal and policy 
structures that have contributed to a constant decline in murder 
rates throughout the nation’s recent history? How can we better 
understand the elements that define its model so that we can imitate 
its success?  In endeavoring to answer these questions and those that 
may derive from them, this Paper conducts a comparative analysis 
between murder rates in the United States and Japan, first 
addressing national tendencies, and then changing the focus of the 
study to specific cities.  Observing the comparatively low number of 
murders in Japan with the rest of the world in general, and the 
United States in particular, this Paper intends to reveal potential 
patterns behind the Nippon nation’s continued success in murder 
prevention, and in understanding the underlying socioeconomic 
and legal factors that lead to it, formulate functional policy 
recommendations for the United States.  The thesis scrutinizes the 
relationship between murder as a legal and policy issue and (i) 
socioeconomic factors, with a specific concentration on inequality 
indexes, unemployment, and poverty, and (ii) police presence and 
the geographical allocation of its resources.  The focused analysis is 
geography-based and it adjusts its lens first at a national scope, 
pursuing a historical socioeconomic analysis of the state of murder 
 
 1  INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, GLOBAL PEACE INDEX: MEASURING PEACE IN A 
COMPLEX WORLD (2019), http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/07/
GPI-2019web.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EQ8-BKUE]; see also Japan, OECD BETTER 
LIFE INDEX, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/japan/ 
[https://perma.cc/W8VP-RHAH] (last visited June. 15, 2020) (“The homicide rate 
(the number of murders per 100 000 inhabitants) is a more reliable measure of a 
country's safety level because, unlike other crimes, murders are usually always 
reported to the police.  According to the latest OECD data, Japan's homicide rate is 
0.2, the lowest rate in the OECD, where the average homicide rate is 3.7.”).  The 
data analysis and policy formulations presented throughout this Paper were 
gathered and generated prior to the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic.  For example, though 
unemployment may have increased in the United States as a direct result to Covid-
19 and its consequent regulatory reactions, lockdown and other shelter-in-place 
policies may interact differently with murder rates than prior freedom of movement 
policies would.  All in all, this Paper does not intend to make claims with respect to 
the influence of the Covid-19 pandemic on murder rates, and how other indicators 
may respond to or network with socioeconomic elements. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/5
2020] Comparative Analysis of Murder Rates 813 
 
commencing in the post-war era; and then pursuing a narrower 
examination at a city-level, offering contemporary comparative 
reviews of the state of murder in Boston and Osaka as well as New 
York and Tokyo. 
The Paper is configured as a critique of Braga, Papachristos, and 
Hureau’s high-crime micro-units thesis of crime (or crime “hot 
spots”). 2   This theory presents two inferences derived from 
observations gathered from the city of Boston’s crime data: (i) most 
homicides occur within specific highly concentrated areas (micro-
units), and (ii) most murders are and will be executed by a highly 
limited group of people with high rates of recidivism.3  The hot spots 
thesis is founded upon the premise of predictive analytics.  Through 
observing the past geolocation of murders, it attempts to predict and 
map the future of nonnegligent killings.  By utilizing predictive 
geospatial modeling, the hot spot theory hopes to allocate police and 
other resources more efficiently, distributing them according to the 
anticipated crime locations.  This Paper intends to analyze, first, 
whether the micro-unit model has value beyond being a description 
of Boston’s murder landscape, and second, whether it can be 
applicable cross-culturally.  It does so by comparing murders in the 
city of Boston with those of Osaka, and for contrastive control, New 
York with Tokyo.  Further, building upon the findings of the 
comparative analysis, this Paper will offer policy recommendations 
for the prevention of murder in the United States. 
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MURDER IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 
A Tale of Murder and the Economy—By the Numbers 
 
The histories of murder in the United States and Japan are 
profoundly different.  Though nominally similar in their point of 
origin, as both nations shared comparable murder rates during the 
beginning of the twentieth century, at some point the path of these 
 
 2 See generally Anthony A. Braga et al., The Concentration and Stability of Gun 
Violence at Micro Places in Boston, 1980-2008, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 26, 33-
53 (2010). 
 3 See discussion infra Section 3.1 (establishing murders as a consequence to 
gun violence, and gun violence being a remarkably concentrated phenomenon per 
Braga et al.’s data-centered conclusions). 
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nations diverged to the vastly different states of murder seen today.  
While Japanese murder rates have fallen steadily throughout recent 
history since World War II, murder rates in the United States have 
been near-perpetually volatile—though subject to a tendential 
decline within the most recent decades.  What are the 
socioeconomic, legal, or policy indicators behind Japan’s steady 
decline and U.S. volatility?  Are there any discernible patterns that 
may inform or affect murder in these two countries beyond 
nebulous culturalist explanations?  To attempt to answer these 
questions and understand the suitability of the high-crime micro-
unit thesis in both nations, it is necessary to lay a historical 
foundation that may create a cohesive and data-driven narrative for 
the evolution and present state of murder rates in both countries 
since the post-war era.  A preliminary methodological step is to 
evaluate and communalize an operational definition regarding how 
Japan and the United States legally categorize murder within their 
respective legal structures. 
The United States defines murder as the unlawful killing of a 
human being with malice. 4   It is the qualifying element of 
intentionality that distinguishes murder from other forms of killing 
(like manslaughter), and the absence of a justification (like self-
defense), that renders the act unlawful. 5   Japan, very closely 
ascribing to these legal parameters, defines murder as homicide 
with intent.  However, in statistically codifying murder data, 
Japanese police include counts of attempted murders (which 
amount to about half  of Japan’s archived aggregate murder count), 
and do not include murders connected to robberies, or assaults that, 
unintentionally, conclude with death (“robbery murders” and 
“lethal assaults,” respectively).  Such robbery murders and lethal 
 
 4 Murder--Definition and Degrees, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
jm/criminal-resource-manual-1536-murder-definition-and-degrees 
[https://perma.cc/UNX7-9WK7] (last updated Jan. 17, 2020); Manslaughter Defined, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1537-
manslaughter-defined [https://perma.cc/NS5Z-WJQE] (last updated Jan. 17, 
2020).  For the data in this Paper (collected mainly from the FBI, the Boston P.D., 
and the New York P.D.), the definitions fall within the parameters of “nonnegligent 
manslaughter as the willful (nonnegligent) killing of one human being by another,” 
as determined by police investigation.  Murder, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/
crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/murder 
[https://perma.cc/9D8Z-599E] (defining murder under the Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program). 
 5 See Murder, FBI: UCR, supra note 4 (defining justifiable homicides). 
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assaults generally account for 10-15% of all killings. 6   With a 
definitional common ground demarcated, the Paper will proceed to 
a country-focused analysis of murder rates, and their 
interrelationship with socioeconomic elements, commencing with 
an examination of the contemporary history of murder in the United 
States. 
In 2017, in the United States, there were a total of 17,284 
murders—a rate of 5.3 murders per 100,000 people. 7   In 
contemporary history, U.S. murder rate trends have stabilized 
between 4 and 6 cases per 100,000.  However, this is just the story of 
the two most recent decades (2000s and 2010s). 8   The broader 
historical trajectory of murder rates in the United States tells a 
different tale—one of almost constant fluctuation.  For the first half 
of the twentieth century, murder rates escalated from averages 
below 3 murders per 100,000 individuals during the century’s first 
decade, to 5 murders per 100,000 throughout the 1920s, to peaks of 
over 10 murders per 100,000 during the late 1920s and early 1930s 
(coinciding with the Great Depression).  Eventually, murder rates 
dropped sharply during the pre-war era, to stabilize at averages of 
under 6 murders per 100,000 individuals in the years immediately 
following World War II.9  Casting a more focused inquiry into post-
war United States, during the 1950s, murder rates rested at values of 
4, and during the early 1960s closer to 5 per 100,000 people once 
 
 6 KEIHŌ [PEN. C.] 1907, art. 199, 205, 240 (Japan), amended by Act No. 54 of 2007; 
Mariko Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, Homicide by Men in Japan, and its Relationship to Age, 
Resources and Risk Taking, 26 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 332, 333-34 (2005). 
 7 See State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, FBI: UCR, https://www.ucr
datatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cfm [https://perma.cc/TUW2-
8NCS]; see also U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime’s International Homicide Statistics 
database, Intentional Homicides (per 100,000 people)–United States, Japan, THE WORLD 
BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?locations=US-JP 
[https://perma.cc/P2YA-2CGY] (last visited June 11, 2020) [hereinafter Intentional 
Homicides]. 
 8 See State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7. 
 9 See State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7; JUSTICE RESEARCH 
& STATISTICS ASS’N, CRIME AND JUSTICE ATLAS 2000, at 38 (2000), https://static.prison
policy.org/scans/Crime_Atlas_2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT2J-WBRU]; Ted 
Robert Gurr, Historical Trends in Violent Crime: A Critical Review of the Evidence, 3 
CRIME & JUST. 295, 295-353 (1981); Randolph Roth, Criminologists and Historians of 
Crime: A Partnership Well Worth Pursuing, 21 CRIME, HIST., & SOCIETIES 389, 389-401 
(2017).  This paper does not pursue exhaustive or specific inquiries related to pre-
WWII era murder rates.  This narrative account is given for general background 
purposes only. 
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again.10  Yet, in the late 1960s, murder rates grew significantly and 
continued to ascend throughout the early 1970s and 1980s.11  During 
these two decades, the United States’ murder rates oscillated at their 
peak around 10 murder cases per 100,000 individuals, with the two 
decades finding an equilibrium just below rates of 9.12  The 1990s 
brought a downwards trend in murder rates, a reduction that would 
see the ratios contract from over 9 at the beginning of the decade, to 
below 6 murders per 100,000 individuals at its conclusion.13  This 
undeviating decline would be continuous until a stabilization 
period throughout the 2000s with rates that stayed in the mid-5 
range—averaging 5.52 murders per 100,000 individuals for the 
decade.14  Currently, the United States seems to be in a period of 
relative stability with a slight uncertainty in its directionality.  The 
murder rate in 2018 of 5.0 murders per 100,000 individuals was 
down from the rates in 2017 (5.3) and 2016 (5.4), but up from those 
in 2015 (4.9) and 2014 (4.4). 15   2014 was the year with the least 
documented murders in the United States since the FBI database 
started recording this data in 1960, marking the bottom of a trough 
which had started in 1991, when murder rates ascended to 9.8, and 
then fell almost steadily since—save for the aforementioned 
stabilization during the 2000s which included slight transitionary 
increases.16  In fact, the 2010s have been America’s safest decade 
according to murder cases in FBI-recorded history.  The 2010s had 
an average rate of 4.85 murders per 100,000 individuals, a stark 
 
 10 See James Alan Fox & Marianne W. Zawitz, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
Homicide Trends in the U.S. (Homicide victimization, 1950-2005), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htius.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW3F-
E4A8]; CRIME AND JUSTICE ATLAS 2000, supra note 9, at 38 (2000). 
 11 See State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id; Intentional Homicides, supra note 7. 
 14  See State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7; Intentional 
Homicides, supra note 7.  According to the FBI database, the standard deviation for 
the 2000s murder rates was the lowest in history.  The 1990s saw the most abrupt 
yearly divergence rates.  For more information on general standard 
deviation/volatility, see discussion infra note 18. 
 15  See Crime in the United States, 1999-2018, FBI: UCR, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/tables/table-1 
[https://perma.cc/XG3S-BEWC]. 
 16 Crime in the United States by Volume and Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants, 1991-
2010, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2010/tables/10tbl01.xls [https://perma.cc/E9P8-Y49W].  See also discussion infra 
note 18. 
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contrast with the 1970s, which suffered the highest rates at 8.97 (with 
a peak average between 1978 and 1982 of 9.58), and below America’s 
comprehensive historic average, which is presently anchored at 6.95 
murders per 100,000.17  In essence, the United States’ state of murder 
is one characterized by general volatility, 18  a tendential relative 
decline throughout the most recent decades, and a slight uptick in 
the most recent years. 
Economically, the trends are quite disparate amongst the 
different selected indicators of inequality, unemployment, and 
poverty.  Inequality follows its own path, while trends in 
unemployment and poverty coincide and travel parallel to those of 
murder rates.  As to the first indicator, inequality indexes in the 
United States have followed an almost entirely linear upwards 
trajectory throughout recent history, tabulating at a 0.415 Gini (a 
standard measure of wealth distribution, where 1 is absolute 
inequality and 0 is absolute equality) in 2016.19  Inequality during 
the 1970s was significantly lower than it is presently, sitting in the 
mid 0.3 ratio during the entire decade.20  The two most significant 
observable increases in inequality in the United States have occurred 
(i) during the beginning of the 1980s, jumping from 0.346 Gini in 
1979 to 0.375 in 1986 (an 8.38% increase in 7 years); and (ii) during 
the early 1990s, growing from 0.382 in 1991 to 0.402 in 1994 (a 5.2% 
increase in 3 years).21  Because of the linear and progressive increase 
in inequality, it is difficult to find a connection at a macroeconomic 
national level between inequality (which has grown consistently) 
and murder rates (which have been subject to abrupt variations, 
seemingly disconnected from the constant increase in economic 
inequality). 
 
 17 See State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7. 
 18  The standard deviation of U.S. murder rates between 1960 and 2018 is 
approximately 6.12% (an average of arithmetic standard deviation of 0.061195882, 
and logarithmic standard deviation of 0.060624622), rendering the annualized 
historical volatility in this 58-year-period 46.62%.  All calculations have been made 
utilizing FBI’s U.C.R. data. 
 19  See Gini Index (World Bank estimate)–United States, WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end=2016&locations=US&st
art=1974&view=chart [https://perma.cc/68EB-67WQ]. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
818 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:3 
Unemployment indicators, on the other hand, seem to share 
direct correlative mirroring with murder rates. 22   In 2019, 
unemployment reached a historic low of approximately 4% in the 
United States, following a continuous descent since the 2008 
economic crisis, after rates of 5% in 2016, 8% in 2012, and 10% in 
2009. 23   Unemployment rates in the United States—like murder 
rates—increased sharply during the 1970s, reaching a peak of 9% 
labor inactivity in 1975 before decreasing slightly, accompanied 
accordingly throughout by equally oscillating murder rates.24  This  
modest decline in both unemployment and murder rates during the 
late 1970s would then revert, cresting above 10% unemployment 
during 1983 and 1984, accompanied again by historic highs in 
murder rates—above 10 murders per 100,000 individuals.25  After 
the early 1980s increase which would present summits in both 
unemployment and murder rates, there would be another slight 
reduction, with a low of 5.3% unemployment in 1989, which would 
last until another increase during the early 1990s—again mirroring 
murder rates.26  Minor fluctuations ensued after this point, but a 
relative balance was found between 4 and 6% unemployment rates 
 
 22  A geographically-focused state-by-state linear regression analysis 
regarding murder-counts in 2018 reveals the correlation coefficient between state 
unemployment rates and homicides is r=0.47749, p=0.0005; and an areal linear 
regression analysis between state poverty and homicide r=0.69928, p=0.000000016.  
Homicide Mortality by State, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/homicide_mortality/homicide.
htm [https://perma.cc/2JRK-4NFZ]; Unemployment Rates for States Annual Average 
Rankings 2012-Present, R.I. DEP’T LAB. & TRAINING, http://www.dlt.ri.gov/
lmi/laus/us/annavg.htm [https://perma.cc/DJ78-BKD9]; Percent of Total 
Population in Poverty, 2018, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://data.ers.usda.gov/
reports.aspx?ID=17826 [https://perma.cc/J6ZQ-793A]. 
 23  Press Release, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, The 
Employment Situation—April 2019 (May 3, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/
news.release/archives/empsit_05032019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y7W-PLXU]; see 
also Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: Unemployment Rate (Data from 1960 to 
2019), U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU
04000000?periods=Annual+Data&periods_option=specific_periods&years_option
=all_years [https://perma.cc/42EQ-LAB5]; Labor Force Statistics from the Current 
Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/help/
one_screen/ln.htm [https://perma.cc/8CLF-78SD] (last modified Feb. 20, 2018); 
ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-
2008, DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ DOC. NO. 236018 (2011). 
 24 See Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: Unemployment Rate (Data from 
1960 to 2019), supra note 23. 
 25 See Id.; State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7. 
 26 See Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: Unemployment Rate (Data from 
1960 to 2019), supra note 23; State and National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7. 
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(accompanied by murder rate stabilization), followed by another 
surge in 2008, which would leave the country with above 9% labor-
inactive population.27  After the 2008 economic crisis, the country 
entered an era of labor recuperation, and unemployment rates have 
steadily decreased to the rates seen today.  There is currently around 
4% total unemployment in the United States. 28   It is directly 
observable that these unemployment fluctuations seem to go almost 
hand in hand with murder rates.29  This correlation is such that it has 
attracted the attention of academia, establishing unemployment 
rates as a strong predictive tool for murder rates in the United 
States. 30   This Paper, however, intends to steer clear of 
monolithically holistic answers to the questions posed by murder 
rates and, though noting the significant and valid relationship 
between unemployment and murder, seeks further comprehension 
of the data in pursuit of policy recommendations that exceed that of 
merely reducing unemployment.  
Having briefly examined inequality and unemployment’s 
relationship with murder rates in the United States generally, this 
 
 27 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, The Employment Situation—April 2019, supra note 23; 
Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: Unemployment Rate (Data from 1960 to 2019), 
supra note 23. 
 28 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, The Employment Situation—April 2019, supra note 23; 
Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: Unemployment Rate (Data from 1960 to 2019), 
supra note 23. 
 29 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, The Employment Situation—April 2019, supra note 23.  
See also Crime in the United States, FBI, supra note 15; Databases, Tables & Calculators 
by Subject: Unemployment Rate (Data from 1960 to 2019), supra note 23; State and 
National Crimes Estimates by Year, supra note 7. 
 30 Scott J. South & Lawrence E. Cohen, Unemployment and the Homicide Rate: A 
Paradox Resolved?, 17 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 325 (1985); see also Steven Raphael & 
Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime, 44 J.L. & ECON. 
259 (2001); Matthew D. Melick, The Relationship Between Crime and Unemployment, 11 
PARK PLACE ECON. 30 (2003); Jeff Grabmeier, Higher Crime Rate Linked to Low Wages 
and Unemployment, Study Finds, OHIO ST. NEWS (Apr. 9, 2002), 
https://news.osu.edu/higher-crime-rate-linked-to-low-wages-and-
unemployment-study-finds/ [https://perma.cc/WG7U-YF67]; Matthew R. Lee, 
Concentrated Poverty, Race, and Homicide, 41 SOC. Q. 189 (2000); Robert Nash Parker, 
Poverty, Subculture of Violence, and Type of Homicide, 67 SOC. FORCES 983 (1989); Maia 
Szalavitz, The Surprising Factors Driving Murder Rates: Income Inequality and Respect, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/08/
income-inequality-murder-homicide-rates [https://perma.cc/2X67-8XJB]; Alan 
Burdziak, Experts Say Connection Between Crime and Poverty is Complex, COLUMBIA 
TRIB. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.columbiatribune.com/51c865d8-9d32-58b9-
b691-a52dcf6dff48.html [https://perma.cc/DY6H-7M3J]. 
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Paper  will proceed to examine another of the selected 
socioeconomic indicators: the potential connection between poverty 
and murder rates at a national level.  Relative poverty rates in the 
United States have remained relatively stable throughout the 
analyzed eras, with fluctuations between 11 and 15% (and usually 
resting between 12 and 14%).  In 2018, poverty rates stood at 12.3%.31  
Just as unemployment accompanies the oscillations in murder rates, 
a macroeconomically-focused approach to poverty follows a similar 
trajectory with contiguous peaks and valleys.  Poverty rates were at 
their minimum and most invariable during the 1970s, with the 
lowest percentage taking place in 1973 at 11.1%. 32   These rates 
remained stable until the late stages of the 1970s, steadily increasing 
and peaking in 1983 at 15.2%, just as murder rates (and 
unemployment) peaked as well. 33   Poverty rates then decreased 
consistently to reach a rate of 12.7% in 1989, and escalated again to 
15.1% in 1994, coinciding once more with an escalation in the 
number of murders in the nation.34  After this peak, the decrease 
remained steady through the 2000s with said stability being 
reflected in murder rates as well, until the 2008 economic crisis, 
which would present significant financial and socioeconomic 
backlash coinciding with an ascent to a 15.1% poverty rate in 2010.35  
It is apparent in this regard that, macroeconomically and at a 
national level, poverty and unemployment in the United States 
mirror each other, and they both correlate strongly with murder, 
whereas inequality has maintained an independent and continuous 
ascent—rendering it a non-factor at a macro-geographical national 
level. 
Japan presents a structurally distinct state of murder from that 
of the United States—both in terms of quantity of murder and 
historical variance.  In Japan, murder rates are, overall, significantly 
lower than those of the United States.  In 2016, when the United 
 
 31 Kayla Fontenot et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Income and Poverty in the United 
States: 2017, Doc. No. P60-263 (Sept. 2018), https://www.census.gov/
content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/demo/p60-263.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UXY2-LP55].  See Poverty Rate (Indicator), ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., https://data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm 
[https://perma.cc/S24R-WZLS]; Japan’s Worsening Poverty Rate, NIPPON.COM (Sept. 
24, 2014), https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00072/ [https://perma.cc/
VN99-B4GU]. 
 32 Fontenot et al., supra note 31. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
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States faced 17,413 murders with a rate of 5.4 per 100,000 people,36 
Japan only had 362 murders in total, for a rate of 0.28 murders per 
100,000 individuals.37  These rates are not uncommon in Japan, a 
country in which the number of murders has a history of yearly 
decrease since the post-war era.  While the United States has 
stabilized within the last decade at averages near 5 murders per 
100,000 individuals, Japan has diminished from averages of 0.6 
during the 1990s, to 0.5 during the 2000s, to less than 0.4 on a 
consistent (and diminishing) basis—culminating in a 0.2 murder 
rate in 2017.38  Japan also exhibits a much more stable overall trend 
than the United States—U.S. murder rates fluctuate and shadow 
unemployment and poverty rates, while Japan follows a stable 
downward trajectory without severe alterations upwards and 
disconnected from socioeconomic influxes.  
Historically, prior to World War II and throughout most of the 
first quarter of the twentieth century, Japan’s murder rates varied 
between averages of 3 and 4.5 murders per 100,000 individuals; 
standards that would drop dramatically during the mid-1930s to 
reach a valley of rates slightly over 1 murder per 100,000 
individuals, stabilizing again above 3.5 in the decade immediately 
following the war.39  However, since the post-war period, and with 
particular intensity since the mid-1950s, the homicide rate has 
decreased at a steady and constant pace.  From the 1960s to the 
1980s, the murder rate undeviatingly fell from 2 per 100,000 to 1.40  
 
 36 See Crime in the United States, FBI, supra note 15. 
 37 See Intentional Homicides, supra note 7. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, supra note 6, at 332, 334, 336; UNITED NATIONS OFFICE 
ON DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE (2013), 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BO
OK_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QJN-Y3U5]; David T. Johnson, Crime and 
Punishment in Contemporary Japan, 36 CRIME AND JUST. 371 (2007); Thomas Ellis & 
Koichi Hamai, Homicide in Japan, in THE HANDBOOK OF HOMICIDE 388 (Fiona 
Brookman et al. eds., 2017); Satoru Kiire et al., 日本における連続殺人事件の類型と
単一殺人事件との比較 [Classification of Serial Homicide and Comparison of Serial 
Homicide with Single Homicide in Japan], 87(6) JAPANESE J. PSYCHOL. 633 (2017), 
https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jjpsy/87/6/87_87.15228/_article/-char/ja/ 
[https://perma.cc/VW2Y-PC2D]; JAPANESE MINISTRY OF JUST., 昭和４３年版 犯罪
白書 第三編/第三編 [WHITE PAPER ON CRIME, PART III STATISTICAL TABLE] (1968), 
http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/9/nfm/n_9_3_1_1_0_0.html#H003001-1H 
[https://perma.cc/D8R3-UAWV] (showing the number of arrest of homicide 
suspects from 1876 to 1967); discussion supra note 20 (delineating the Paper’s 
historical analysis past WWII). 
 40 See Intentional Homicides, supra note 7. 
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Since then, rates have only continued to decrease stably throughout 
the decades.41  In essence, Japan’s murder rates enjoy a continuous 
decline since the post-World War II era—a fall that is disconnected 
from socioeconomic deviations and influences. 
Economically, as mentioned above, Japanese murder rates do 
not seem to have a conditional relationship with fluctuations in 
inequality, unemployment, or poverty, thus presenting a structural 
difference with the United States, where the data appears to suggest 
strong connections between socioeconomic indicators and murder 
rates.  Inequality in Japan is comparatively less significant than that 
of the United States, and, unlike in the United States, it does not 
trend exclusively upwards.42  Between 1985 and 2000, Gini indexes 
reflected an increase from 0.304 to 0.337. 43   However, by 2003 
inequality measurements decreased to 0.321.44  Between 2003 and 
2009, there was another increase, which would leave the index 
standing at 0.336.  This uptick was followed by another decrease in 
2012, seeing numbers return to 0.33.45  Between 2009 and 2013, while 
the United States exhibited an estimated Gini coefficient of 0.453, 
Japan sustained an average of 0.329.46   Hence, while the United 
 
 41 The only exceptions have been (i) a slight increase from 0.45 in 2007 to 0.51 
in 2008 (from 574 to 654 total murders, coinciding with the economic recession) to 
continue the downward trend in following years (506 total murders in 2009, 465 in 
2010, 442 in 2011, 429 in 2012); (ii) from 370 in 2013 to 395 in 2014, to continue the 
downward trend in following years (363 in 2015, 362 in 2016); and (iii) from 306 
total murders in 2017 to 334 in 2018.  See Victims of intentional homicide, 1990-2018, 
UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME https://dataunodc.un.org/content/
data/homicide/homicide-rate [https://perma.cc/5ZEB-JJ6E]. 
 42  Income Inequality, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., https://data.
oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm [https://perma.cc/N95S-VKDW] 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2019); see also THE ATLAS OF HEALTH INEQUALITIES IN JAPAN 6 
(Tomoki Nakaya & Yuri Ito eds., 2019). 
 43 See Income Inequality, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 42; 
THE ATLAS OF HEALTH INEQUALITIES IN JAPAN, supra note 42. 
 44 See Income Inequality, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 42; 
THE ATLAS OF HEALTH INEQUALITIES IN JAPAN, supra note 42. 
 45  Income Inequality, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.; THE ATLAS OF 
HEALTH INEQUALITIES IN JAPAN, supra note 42; see generally Mitsumaru Kumagai et 
al., Japan’s Economy: Monthly Review, DAIWA:  INST. RES. (Oct. 21, 2016). 
 46 See Toshiaki Aizawa, Robert Dekle & Matthias Helble, Sources of Income 
Inequality: A Comparison of Japan and the United States 4 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., 
Working Paper No. 663, Feb. 2017), https://www.adb.org/sites/
default/files/publication/228471/adbi-wp663.pdf [https://perma.cc/GBP5-
BXMQ]; see generally FREDERICK SOLT, THE STANDARDIZED WORLD INCOME 
INEQUALITY DATABASE, VERSION 8 (2019). 
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States’ wealth disparity continues to soar, unequal distribution of 
wealth in Japan is not only (i) comparatively smaller, but (ii) exhibits 
elements of cyclicality, and (iii) appears disconnected from 
progressively diminishing murder rates. 
Unemployment in Japan has also remained relatively stable, 
oscillating between rates of 1 and 3%.47  In 2019, the unemployment 
rate rested at 2.5%, 48  consistent with professional inactivity 
historical rates.  The exception to this stability occurred during the 
1990s, a time that historians and experts on Japan have referred to 
as “the lost decade,” an economic period in which the Japanese 
economy stagnated, halting its previous meteoric growth.49  Before 
that, throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, unemployment 
percentages in post-war Japan stood between 1 and 2%.50  During 
the 1970s, unemployment stabilized with figures between 2 and 3%, 
and though unemployment rose, murder rates kept their steady 
decline. 51   As previously mentioned, the rupture to Japan’s 
continuous economic prosperity arrived during the 1990s—an era in 
which unemployment would increase, but murders would continue 
their inexorable decline.  The lost decade would bring with it a 
steady increase in unemployment, peaking in the early 2000s above 
5%.52  After this cycle, there was a slight period of recuperation, and 
the rates fell again to around 3.5%.53  However, this recuperation 
 
 47  Unemployment, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., https://data.
oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm [https://perma.cc/GE54-S6HU] (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2019; see also Japan Unemployment Rate (1953-2020 Data), 
TRADINGECONOMICS, https://tradingeconomics.com/japan/unemployment-rate 
[https://perma.cc/4VLV-KCHD]. 
 48 Unemployment, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 47; see also 
Japan Unemployment Rate (1953-2020 Data), supra note 47. 
 49 See generally Tamin Bayoumi, The Morning After: Explaining the Slowdown in 
Japanese Growth in the 1990s, 53 J. INT’L ECON. 241 (1999); Naohisa Hirakata, et al., 
Japan’s Financial Crises and Lost Decades, 40 JAPAN WORLD ECON. 31 (2016); Fumio 
Hayashi & Edward C. Prescott, The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade, 5 REV. ECON. 
DYNAMICS 206 (2002); HIROSHI NAKASO, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN JAPAN DURING THE 
1990S: HOW THE BANK OF JAPAN RESPONDED AND THE LESSONS LEARNT, BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS PAPER NO. 6 (Oct. 2001), https://www.bis.org/
publ/bppdf/bispap06.pdf [https://perma.cc/39W2-E6HU]; Naoki Abe, Japan’s 
Shrinking Economy, BROOKINGS (Feb. 12, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/
opinions/japans-shrinking-economy/ [https://perma.cc/Z5PU-UX89]. 
 50 See Unemployment, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 47. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
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was a transitory mirage that did not account for the 2008 economic 
recession, which sent unemployment rates back above 5%. 54  
Nevertheless, this peak was short-lived, and unemployment rates 
since have kept plummeting, reaching slightly above 2% in recent 
years. 55  Throughout these fluctuations in unemployment at a 
national level, murder rates have continued to descend.  In this 
regard, Japan differs from the United States in that unemployment 
rates are more stable (even in periods of recession) and are not 
mirrored by murder rates. 
Poverty rates in Japan are below those in the United States, but 
not considerably so.56  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (“O.E.C.D.”) categorized the United States as 
having a poverty rating of 0.178, while Japan’s was 0.157.57  Poverty 
rates in Japan, contrary to murder rates, have followed a steady 
increase in recent history.  While in the mid-1980s relative poverty 
rates were stable at around 12%.  In the 1990s, the lost decade would 
usher in an increase to 15%. 58   Continued economic stasis, in 
addition to a gradual resurgence from the 2008 economic crisis, 
drove Japan to a poverty rate of 16.1% in 2012.59  Though the Nippon 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR AND WELFARE, 各種世帯の所得等の状況
[INCOME DISTRIBUTION], https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/k-tyosa/k-
tyosa16/dl/03.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PW3-4KDV]. 
 57  Poverty Rate, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., https://data.
oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm [https://perma.cc/XGH9-HHJ8] (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2019). 
 58 In 2011, demands for social welfare services (Seikatsu-hogo) reached a peak 
of two million people.  For more information on welfare distribution rates, see 
UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL (Townsend Centre for International Poverty Research) & 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF POPULATION & SOCIAL SECURITY RESEARCH (Kokuritsu Shakai 
Hoshō Jinkō Mondai Kenkyūjo, IPSS), Research Seminar: The State of the Art of 
Measuring Poverty and Social Exclusion in the UK and Japan, https://www.bristol.
ac.uk/poverty/ESRCJSPS/uk/1/iwata.html [https://perma.cc/3L5G-XMTD] 
[hereinafter Poverty Research Seminar].  Poverty rates seem to concentrate in the 
elderly, the single, and in particular, the single mothers.  See Japan’s Worsening 
Poverty Rate, NIPPON.COM (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.nippon.com/en/
features/h00072/japan%E2%80%99s-worsening-poverty-rate.html#note-1-1 
[https://perma.cc/6CY4-BDSP] (discussing the increase in relative poverty in 
Japan while absolute poverty is decreasing); Masami Iwata, UK-Japan 
Measurement of Poverty Seminar: Poverty and Social Exclusion in Japan: An 
Overview from the 1990s and Recent Policy Responses (Jan. 6, 2012) (unpublished 
paper) (analyzing the role of social assistance in measuring poverty). 
 59 See Japan’s Worsening Poverty Rate, supra note 58. 
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nation has partially recuperated since then, achieving a 15.6% rate 
of poverty in 2015,60  the disparity with the United States in this 
particular measurement remains relatively limited.  In fact, in 2017, 
the difference between the countries was only 1% (with relative 
poverty rates of 16.3 in Japan, and 17.3% in the United States).61  
Nonetheless, and despite the limited divergence between the 
nations, what can be asserted is that Japan’s murder rate has not 
historically increased with increasing poverty rates.  Murder rates 
keep declining, disconnected from the rise in poverty, unlike in the 
United States where murder rates and poverty indicators show 
associative signs. 
At first glance, the United States has more murders per capita 
than Japan by a significant margin.  Historically, U.S. rates have 
oscillated between 4 and 7 murders per 100,000 individuals, with an 
average rate between 1960 and 2018 of 6.95.  The American history 
of murder is characterized by significant fluctuations and 
directional variance.  Japanese murder rates, which existed at rates 
of approximately 3.5 murders per 100,000 individuals in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, have been on a continuous and inexorable 
decline since.  Whereas contemporary U.S. murder rate trends 
oscillate between 5 and 6 murders per 100,000 individuals, with an 
average rate for the last two decades (2000s and 2010s) of 5.19; 
murder rates in Japan have stabilized below 0.3 in recent decades.  
But beyond this axiomatic conclusion, there is a more nuanced 
inference underlying this trend, and it is tied to rate volatility and 
socioeconomic responsiveness.  The United States’ murder rates 
seem responsive to socioeconomic tendencies and trajectories: 
murder rates mirror the ups and downs of different economic 
indexes.  In particular, there is an observable relationship between 
murder rates and unemployment as well as accompanying poverty 
 
 60 Japan’s Poverty Rate Remains Well Above OECD Average, NIPPON.COM (June 
27, 2017), https://www.nippon.com/en/behind/l10354/japan%27s-poverty-rate-
remains-well-above-oecd-average-news.html [https://perma.cc/HGC4-L6X8]. 
 61 Justin McCurry, Japan’s Rising Child Poverty Exposes True Cost of Two Decades 
of Economic Decline, GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/jan/17/japans-rising-child-poverty-exposes-truth-behind-two-
decades-of-economic-decline [https://perma.cc/GEG7-ALZY]; Japan’s Working 
Poor Struggling: Poverty Worsens as More Japanese Work on Non-permanent Contracts, 
ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015), https://www.economist.com/asia/2015/04/04/
struggling [https://perma.cc/UQX5-XD3K] (outlining Japan’s relative poverty 
rates and their sociodemographic effects). 
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rates, though murder does not seem to correlate with inequality, 
which maintains a steady ascension throughout contemporary 
American economic history.  In Japan, murders keep declining in 
number, despite fluctuations in socioeconomic indicators.  Murder 
rates are in a constant and continuous downward trajectory, 
remaining unresponsive to external influxes and variations in the 
economy.  It is worth mentioning that, during Japan’s lost decade—
a period characterized by economic stasis—murder rates did not 
increase.  While murder rates in the United States appear volatile 
and susceptible to their socioeconomic context, recent Japanese 
history shows a continuously declining progression, autonomous 
and independent from the selected indicators of inequality, 
unemployment, and poverty.  After World War II, Japan had an 
inflection point in its murder rate, and has experienced a continuous 
downward trend ever since, while U.S. murder rates adjust to the 
waves of socioeconomic inference. 
3. CITY COMPARISONS: GEOGRAPHICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MURDER, SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS, AND THE POLICE 
3.1. The High-Crime Micro-Unit Thesis and its Shortcomings 
Assessing risk of murder by street intersection 
 
The importance of geography in relation to murder has been 
studied and examined by legal, criminal, and social academics in 
multiple ways.  The two principal manners in which geography’s 
significance has been utilized as an instrument to inform policy 
recommendations regarding murder reduction are: (i) utilizing 
geography as an explanatory element for crime, building upon the 
assumption that geo-environmental and systemic social networks 
affect criminal choices, 62  and (ii) as a predictive tool, deploying 
 
 62 These explanatory theories tend to connect underprivileged communities 
with higher rates of crime.  See generally BETSY GOTBAUM, OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. PUB. 
ADVOCATE, OLD PROBLEM, NEW EYES: YOUTH INSIGHTS ON GANGS IN NEW YORK CITY 
(2008); STEVEN F. MESSNER &  RICHARD ROSENFELD, CRIME AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 
(5th ed. 2013) (describing the sociocultural origins of crime); EAMONN CARRABINE, 
CRIME AND SOCIAL THEORY (2017) (applying sociological theory to the study of 
criminology); KEVIN M. BEAVER, THE NATURE AND NURTURE OF ANTISOCIAL 
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location of crime as an element that can serve to anticipate and 
predict future crime. 
Explanatory models understand geographic communities as 
sociocultural sources of crime, and by providing analytical 
foundations as to the nature of the root of crime, attempt to 
understand, and comprehensively address its causes and structural 
components.  Predictive models separate themselves from the 
qualitative essence that permeates explanatory theses, somewhat 
discarding the interpretive premises that underlie criminal activity.  
Instead, they choose to comprehend the geo-spatial order and 
method to crime.  By identifying the systemic patterns embedded 
within the location of past crimes, these models attempt to discern 
potential future locations of criminal activity.  Most models draw 
from elements on both sides of this dichotomy, as these theoretical 
pillars are not exclusive nor entirely independent.  Both analytic 
propositions acknowledge that geography is a crucial component in 
determining crime in general and murder in particular, though they 
approach crime prevention and resolution differently. 
Predictive models, like the one evaluated and applied in this 
Paper, are not novel in concept, and they generally build on decades 
of data observation.  In the 1950s and 1960s, legal researchers and 
 
OUTCOMES (2008) (exploring biosocial explanations for criminal behavior); DONALD 
R. CRESSEY AND DAVID A. WARD, DELINQUENCY, CRIME, AND SOCIAL PROCESS (1969) 
(applying sociological theory to the study of criminology); DON C. GIBBONS, SOCIETY, 
CRIME, AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (1987) (outlining perspectives on the relationship 
between social structure and criminal behavior); HUGH D. BARLOW & SCOTT H. 
DECKER, CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY: PUTTING THEORY TO WORK (2010) 
(describing the capabilities of public policy to impact criminal behavior); CARLO 
MORSELLI, CRIME AND NETWORKS (2014) (relating crime networks to crime 
geography and co-offending patterns); TIM NEWBURN &  RICHARD SPARKS, CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE AND POLITICAL CULTURES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF 
CRIME CONTROL (2004) (exploring national and international elements of policy as a 
controlling superstructure of criminal activity); DON CREWE, BECOMING CRIMINAL: 
THE SOCIO-CULTURAL ORIGINS OF LAW, TRANSGRESSION, AND DEVIANCE (2013) 
(analyzing the socio-cultural origins of crime).  See also David Canter & Donna 
Youngs, Crime and Society, 11 CONTEMP. SOC. SCI. 283, 283-88 (2016); Robert J. Bursik, 
Social Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency: Problems and Prospects, 
26 CRIMINOLOGY 519, 519-51 (1988); Charis Kubrin & Ronald Weitzer. New Directions 
in Social Disorganization Theory, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 374, 374-402 (2003) 
(linking criminal activity to what can be addressed as “social disorganization,” 
establishing crime as a consequence to neighborhood dynamics with high mobility, 
non-cohesive and disaggregating criminal dynamics, and crime-prone social 
dysfunctionality). 
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criminologists were already identifying and recognizing similar 
geographical tendencies.  Observing, for example, that in Houston 
70% of murders took place in 18% of the census tracts in the city,63 
and that in Cleveland data showed that two thirds of the crimes took 
place in 12% of the geographical space of the city. 64   Modern 
technology and advanced data-gathering techniques have paved 
this old path, and given way to highly sophisticated methods of 
crime mapping.65  By sequencing and geo-referencing crime records, 
these models of crime codification generate operational risk-
intensity values 66  that aid in the visualization of patterns of 
criminality risk by geographical area.67   One of the foundational 
assumptions to the success of these models is that they perceive past 
crime as a extrapolative communication of future crime, and task the 
past to optimally predict forthcoming criminal activity.68 
The theory that this Paper addresses falls within the predictive 
category, and intends to advance its principles to new levels of geo-
positional certainty through advancing the predictive data inferred 
from (i) geolocation of crime, and (ii) those who perpetrate it.  Braga, 
Papachristos, and Hureau’s high-crime micro-unit thesis (or hot 
spot theory) 69  attempts to, through location-data gathering and 
regressive inferences, detect and identify crime patterns, and, 
determining where murders (and shootings) occurred in the past, 
conclude where they are most likely to happen in the future.70  Their 
findings, however, take the theory one step further to conclude that 
“city-level gun violence trends may best be understood by the 
analyses of trends at a very small number of micro places, such as 
street segments and intersections, rather than analyses of trends at 
larger areal units such as neighborhoods, arbitrarily-defined 
policing districts, or  census tracts.”71 
 
 63  Henry A. Bullock, Urban Homicide in Theory and Fact, 45 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 565, 565‒75 (1955); ROBERT C. BENSING & OLIVER SCHROEDER, JR., 
HOMICIDE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY 567‒69 (1960). 
 64 BENSING & SCHROEDER, supra note 63. 
 65  SHANE D. JOHNSON, KATE J. BOWERS & KEN PEASE, CRIME SCIENCE: NEW 
APPROACHES TO PREVENTING AND DETECTING CRIME 145 (2005). 
 66 Id. at 147. 
 67 Id. at 152. 
 68 Id. at 146. 
 69 See generally Braga et al., supra note 2; see also JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 65, 
at 148. 
 70 See generally Braga et al., supra note 2. 
 71 Id. at 48. 
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Furthermore, Braga et al. reject the idea that defining the “at-
risk” population as “young, minority males living in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods” is sufficient. 72   Their thesis deems this 
categorization of murder-perpetrators as insufficiently refined and 
suggests it does not capture the actual levels of concentration of city-
based gun violence. 73   In fact, they propose that murder cases, 
consequent to gun violence, are much more concentrated than 
previous proposals may submit. 74   Their findings can be better 
explained in a two-part conclusion, which will be comparatively 
analyzed throughout the next section.  Generally, the hot spots 
theory addresses and predicts (i) the individuals that commit 
murder, and (ii) the locations in which murder occurs.  Pertaining to 
the first analytical element, that of perpetrators, in 2006 “about 1% 
of Boston’s youth ages 15-24 participated in gangs and these gangs 
accounted for 50% of total homicides, 77% of youth homicides, and 
70% of fatal and non-fatal shootings in Boston.”75  Regarding the 
second analytical element, that of geographical allocation of 
criminal incidents, 89% of street segments in Boston never withstood 
any reported firearm related incident, around 6% had a single 
firearm incident, and the remaining shootings occurred in 5% of the 
street segments.76  The analytical conclusion that can be drawn from 
their theory is that murder is “largely concentrated at a small 
number of gun violence hot spots.”77  In order to remedy hot spot 
violence, Braga et al. propose a model in which prevention efforts 
(both in terms of police action and social work) are dedicated and 
focused in very specific locations and towards very specific people 
rather than diffused across neighborhoods.78 
This Paper observes these categorized qualities (perpetrators’ 
network79  and geographical location) as potentially predictive but 
 
 72 Id. at 48-51. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 48-49. 
 77 Id. at 50. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Though the Paper does not address this issue directly or exhaustively, it is 
worth noting that it identifies that a comprehensively reductionist approach to the 
human component of Braga et al.’s proposition appears to determine commission 
of past crime as a sign of high likelihood of potential commission of future crime.  
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finds the hot spot theory insufficiently explanatory.  The Paper 
attempts to uncover more granular qualities that may contribute to 
an explanation for the existence of hot spots, as well as expand its 
potential multi-city and cross-cultural contributions to the reduction 
of murder rates.  The comparative analysis that will be conducted 
intends to assess the socio-legal value of the thesis at transnational, 
and therefore intercultural levels.  In this regard, through the 
contrastive scrutiny of different cities, this Paper aims to assess the 
value of the hot spot model as either potentially applicable through 
a wide range of cities, or as merely descriptive of Boston’s gun 
violence problem.  To this end, this Paper sets out to accomplish two 
main objectives.  The first objective of the Paper is to establish 
whether the model is internationally and interculturally useful and 
applicable.  The second objective of this Paper is to serve as a basis 
to achieve a better understanding of the model, adding potential 
avenues of implementation and development to it.  This 
development intends to both substantiate more robust exegetic 
foundations for the concentration of geographically-allocated 
criminal activity in general, and murders in particular; and add to 
the serviceability of culturally expansive implementable policy 
recommendations.  In other words, building on the knowledge and 
inferences provided by predictive modeling as well as on the 
comparative transnational and intercultural conclusions, this Paper 
intends to produce effective policy recommendations that may serve 
to reduce crime in the form of murder in the United States.  The cities 
to be comparatively analyzed for these purposes are Boston and 
Osaka, as well as New York and Tokyo. 
The foundational reasoning and policy proposals addressed and 
projected by this Paper attempt to avoid entirely culturalist 
approaches to sociolegal issues of conduct.  Put differently, the 
Paper purposefully avoids exclusively cultural arguments and 
explanations ascribed solely to particular cultures or subcultures of 
violence, instead pursuing to endorse concrete, tangible, and 
specific recommendations.  Though not intending to establish that 
 
This could create a necessarily prejudicial and discriminatory conceptualization 
towards offenders, informing equally prejudicial and discriminatory policies, both 
(i) in an unfair, unjust, and pre-injurious manner, and (ii) becoming a source for 
decision-making bias, marking these individuals for a higher likelihood of 
secondary deviation, among other harmful social consequences. 
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culture has no explanatory value, 80  purely historic and cultural 
critiques are difficult to translate into constructive policy goals with 
direct and observable results.  Furthermore, at its inception, this 
Paper recognizes that the elements addressed in this analysis 
(economic factors and policing) are not the exclusive elements that 
may contribute to murder as a social issue but that they are relatively 
unexplored together, and have the potential to provide explanatory 
insights for murder rate variance, as well as to become resources for 
policy formulations deployed towards the reduction of said rates.  
Boston is necessarily selected for this analysis because it is the 
city in which Bragas et al.’s foundational investigation was 
conducted.  Osaka was chosen as a contrast city to Boston, due to its 
geographical and identity proximity to the economic center of the 
country (in Japan Tokyo, and in the United States New York), in 
addition to their resemblance as post-industrial second-tier 
metropolises. New York and Tokyo were chosen as comparative 
control cities, with the aspiration that, not only would they serve as 
governing elements to the corroborative efforts of the Paper, but that 
their contrast might enhance and increase the effectiveness of the 
analysis.  The added value of this international, multi-city, and 
pluri-jurisdictional contrastive and evaluative exercise is central to 
the Paper.  Observing the dramatically lower murder rates in Japan 
through a comparative sociolegal and policy lens, the Paper intends 
to identify key differences between the United States and Japan—
within the categories of socioeconomic context and policing—to 
propose policy recommendations directed at reducing murder rates 
in the United States in emulating some of Japan’s successful 
approaches to the issue. 
 
 80 The literature tends to allude to Japan’s post-war resurgence and its cultural 
symbiosis with rejection of violence, or other purely cultural elements like the 
stigmatization of arrest, elevated social cohesion, and individual moral prevention 
patterns consequent to an acute social awareness of the limitations of one’s freedom 
as some of the possible explanations for the continuous decline in murders.  This 
Paper will attempt to move beyond these types of esoteric statements to produce 
corporeal and implementable policy recommendations based on Japan’s 
discernable sociolegal design and structural policy success at reducing murder 
rates.  GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE, supra note 39; W. K. PARK, TRENDS IN CRIME 
RATES IN POSTWAR JAPAN: A STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE (2006); Nobuo Komiya, A 
Cultural Study Of The Low Crime Rate In Japan, 39 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 369, 369-90 
(1999). 
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3.2. Boston and Osaka 
Murder, the Economy, and the Police: Inequality and Concentration, 
Against Integration and Dispersion 
 
The objective of this section is to uncover potential patterns 
underlying the grouping, organization, and materialization of 
murder that may be encountered in Boston and Osaka; and either 
confirm or refute the applicable efficacy of the hot spot theory in 
multi-city and cross-cultural conditions.  Then, conclusions will be 
drawn as to the similarities or differences between both cities to 
build upon Bragas et al.’s model for the purposes of policy 
recommendations.  The structure of the analysis will first follow a 
contextualization of the cities within their respective nations and 
regions, proceeding with an examination of socioeconomic factors 
and their relationship to historic and geographic murder patterns, 
continuing with a comparative analysis of police force geographical 
presence, concluding with a valuation of the hot spots theory and its 
validity. 
First, both cities should be contextualized in terms of where they 
stand as to murder rates within their nations, to better understand 
how representative they are as a sample, as well as reference the 
position they occupy within their respective regional conditions.  
Though the cities may be similar in general terms as to their country 
geopolitical significance as urban nuclei and regarding sociocultural 
positioning, as well as in murder rates relative to their country 
average, they occupy vastly different spaces in what pertains to their 
directly comparable intentional homicide averages.  In the United 
States in 2016, the total national murder rate was 5.4 per 100,000 
individuals.81  Massachusetts ranked as the 9th state with the lowest 
murder rates, with 1.9 per 100,000 individuals—well below the 
Northeast region 82  average of 3.5 murders. 83   In 2016, Boston 
accumulated 36.57% of all Massachusetts murders cases, for a rate 
 
 81 Crime in the United States, FBI, supra note 15. 
 82 See Crime in the United States by Region, Geographic Division, and State, 2015-
2016, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2016/tables/table-2 [https://perma.cc/6XMB-XERJ]. 
 83 Id. 
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of 7.27 intentional homicides per 100,000 individuals.84  This 7.27 
murder rate positions Boston significantly above the United States 
average of 5.4 and critically above the Massachusetts average of 1.9.  
In essence, Massachusetts is a comparatively peaceful state85   in 
relation to the rest of the United States, but Boston’s murder rate is 
above the national average, and significantly above the regional and 
state averages. 
In 2016, the Osaka Prefecture police reported a total of 110 
murders.86  This set the prefecture’s murder rate at an estimated 0.55 
per 100,000 individuals—which, though significantly lower than 
Boston’s 7.27, was still above Japan’s 0.28 national average, 
encompassing 30.39% of the nation’s total murders that year. 87  
Despite Osaka having murder rates that surpass the national norm, 
and being historically regarded as one of the cities with the highest 
murder rates in the country,88 the Nippon city ranks number three 
 
 84  In Massachusetts there were 134 murders, for a total population of 
6,811,779.  In Boston, there were 49 murders, for a total population of 673,880.  
Massachusetts: Offenses Known to Law Enforcement, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/
crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/tables/table-6/table-6-state-
cuts/massachusetts.xls [https://perma.cc/9E77-A537]. 
 85 Further contextualizing the present state of gun violence in Boston and 
N.Y.C., Massachusetts and New York state were tied in 2017 for second place as the 
States with the least gun deaths in the United States (48th and 49th respectively).  In 
both Massachusetts and New York gun-related fatalities stood at 3.7 per 100,000 
residents, and the only state with less firearm deaths was Hawaii with 2.5.  This 
situates Massachusetts and New York well below the national average for gun-
related fatalities per state, which stood at 13.6 per 100,000 residents.  The list was 
led by the state of Alaska with a rate of 24.5 firearm-related deaths per 100,000 
individuals.  Gun-related fatality rates did not descend to the single-digit 
measurements until the 41st state in the descending ranking (Iowa, 9.0)—making 
Massachusetts and New York statistical anomalies.  The gun-related issues of these 
states are grave in comparison to those of Japan, but within the U.S.  national 
average, they fall within a moderate spectrum—evidencing the severity of the 
United States’ gun problem when compared to Japanese firearm social dynamics.  
Firearm Mortality by State, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION., 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/firearm_mortality/firearm.htm 
[perma.cc/N2KG-ZV2Y] (last updated Apr. 29, 2020). 
 86  See 重 要 犯 罪 (Crime Statistics), OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, 
https://www.police.pref.osaka.lg.jp/material/files/group/2/h30_02.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YS7F-D6JD]. 
 87 Intentional Homicides, supra note 7; Japan, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, supra 
note 1. 
 88 犯罪統計資料: 平成18年1~12月分[Crime Statistics: January – December 2006], 
NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, http://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/keiji21/20070409.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7PN2-UAVZ].  
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on The Economist’s list of the Safe Cities Index, which speaks 
favorably to the safety of Japan overall.89  Osaka may have higher 
murder rates than the rest of Japan, but it is still considered a 
remarkably safe city from an international perspective. 
The main theoretical outcomes of the high-crime micro-unit 
thesis are intrinsically related to murder location—an analysis of 
both the micro-geographical setting of the murders, as well as how 
they interact with the socioeconomic factors and policing structure 
surrounding them follows.  In Boston, as mentioned above, only 1% 
of local youth from the ages of 15 to 24 participated in gangs, and 
these gangs accounted for 50% of the murders and 70% of all fatal 
shootings.90  Regarding location, 89% of street segments in Boston 
never withstood any reported firearm related incident, around 6% 
had a single firearm incident, and the remaining 5% of the street 
segments absorbed the overwhelming majority of gun violence and 
consequent murder.91 
What is particularly relevant for understanding the hot spot that 
so disproportionately represents Boston’s crime rates within a 
socioeconomic and policing context is that murders occur in the 
areas of the city most affected by inequality.  These are also the areas 
of the city with the highest unemployment rates, the highest indexed 
poverty, the least police community-presence, and the least 
geographically integrated dispersion of police forces. 
Boston’s inequality ratios are amongst the highest of any city in 
America.92  In 2014, Boston topped the Brookings Institute inequality 
 
 89 THE ECONOMIST, SAFE CITIES INDEX 2017: SECURITY IN A RAPIDLY URBANISING 
WORLD (2017), https://dkf1ato8y5dsg.cloudfront.net/uploads/5/82/safe-cities-
index-eng-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQX5-YP66]. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Braga et al., supra note 2, at 48-49. 
 92 Kyle Scott Clauss, Boston’s Income Inequality, Visualized, BOSTON MAG. (Feb. 
23, 2017, 11:11 AM), https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2017/
02/23/boston-income-inequality-map/ [https://perma.cc/U9LT-4P52]; Benjamin 
Swasey, Report: Boston Ranks No. 1 For City Income Inequality, WBUR NEWS (Jan. 14, 
2016), https://www.wbur.org/news/2016/01/14/boston-income-inequality-
brookings-2016-update [https://perma.cc/HD5C-H6CZ]; Natalie Holmes & Alan 
Berube, City and Metropolitan Inequality on the Rise, Driven by Declining Incomes, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/city-and-
metropolitan-inequality-on-the-rise-driven-by-declining-incomes/ 
[https://perma.cc/H3KY-ZWSE].  Boston (like Osaka) suffers higher poverty and 
unemployment rates than the national average.  The fact that these two indicators 
are elevated above the national average, and accompanied by higher murder rates, 
seems to corroborate that, at least in this case, and attaining exclusively to these 
isolated factors, higher wealth inequality and poverty may produce higher murder 
rates. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/5
2020] Comparative Analysis of Murder Rates 835 
 
charts with a ratio of 17.8 (when the average ratio across the United 
States was 9.3 for metropolitan areas and 11.8 for large cities).93  The 
gap between the wealthy and the poor remains one of the widest 
throughout the United States, but in 2016 Boston dropped to sixth 
place in the large city ranking, accumulating a still significant 
inequality index of 14.7. 94   Though comparatively reducing its 
inequality indexes at a national level, this reduction is slight, and 
Boston remains a highly inequitable city. 
In 2016, the city of Boston had an unemployment rate that 
oscillated between 3 and 4%. 95   This is a lower figure than in 
previous recent years, and evidences a constant trajectory of labor 
rate improvement for the city.  In 2014, just two years prior, the rate 
stood at 6%, and in 2010, it was at 8%.96  Unemployment is currently 
similar to the national average, which has stabilized around 4%.97  In 
what pertains to poverty, Boston’s relative rates are above 20%—
and have been for the last decade, with few oscillations.98  This is 
significantly higher than the national average, which currently 
stands at around 12%. 99   However, what is most significant 
 
 93 See City and Metropolitan Inequality on the Rise, Driven by Declining Incomes 
BROOKINGS INST., supra note 92. 
 94 Alan Berube, City and Metropolitan Income Inequality Data Reveal Ups and 
Downs Through 2016, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/city-and-metropolitan-income-inequality-data-reveal-ups-and-downs-
through-2016/ [https://perma.cc/3K65-7CNQ]. 
 95 Local Area Unemployment Statistics, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://data.
bls.gov/timeseries/LAUMT257165000000003?amp%253bdata_tool=XGtable&out
put_view=data&include_graphs=true [https://perma.cc/6MNZ-5367]. 
 95 Database, Tables, & Calculators by Subject: Local Area Unemployment Statistics, 
U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LAUMT2571650000
00003?amp%253bdata_tool=XGtable&output_view=data&include_graphs=true 
[https://perma.cc/6MNZ-5367] (last visited June 16, 2020). 
 96 In 2014, the unemployment rate was 5.2%, 2015 4.3%, 2016 3.5%, 2017 3.4%, 
and 2018 3.0%.  Id. (indicating a linearly constant betterment of unemployment). 
 97 See discussion supra Section 2. 
 98  QuickFacts: Boston City, Massachusetts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/bostoncitymassachusetts/IPE12
0217#IPE120217 [https://perma.cc/QG59-FEEN] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); 
DATAUSA: BOSTON, MA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/boston-ma/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZLT3-LYEX] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); Poverty in Boston, 
BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY/RES. DIVISION (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.bostonplans.org/getattachment/f1ecaf8a-d529-40b6-a9bc-
8b4419587b86 [https://perma.cc/EP3S-WVTU]. 
 99 Fontenot et al., supra note 31. 
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pertaining to micro-locational wealth disparity concentration is that 
the neighborhoods with the highest murder intensity are also those 
most disproportionately affected by the inequality that afflicts the 
city. 100   Most murders occur in the neighborhoods of Mattapan 
(15.1% unemployment), Dorchester (12.6%), and Roxbury (14.3%)—
where most of the households earn under $20,000 in yearly 
income.101  The poorest neighborhoods are concentrated in the south 
of Boston—this is also the area in which most of the murders occur, 
and the area in which there is less geographically-integrated 
community police presence.  There is only one police station located 
roughly at the geographical center between the three 
neighborhoods, though dislodged from the spaces in which murder 
cases cluster.102 
In Osaka, unlike in Boston, crime generally and murder in 
particular seems to spread itself much more evenly throughout 
districts—in both the prefecture and the city.103  In the same way, 
police presence disperses accordingly, and law enforcement is much 
 
 100 Neighborhood Unemployment: A Technical Note, BOSTON PLAN. & DEV. AGENCY 
RES. DIVISION (2017), http://www.bostonplans.org/getattachment/95a9e699-fd4e-
4224-a8a8-df01a563e8b6 [https://perma.cc/HHA9-56VW]; Unemployment in 
Boston, BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY/RES. DIVISION (2014), 
http://www.bostonplans.org/getattachment/390b9ea9-61d7-467b-9a4c-
f6e8588aa4b0 [https://perma.cc/2VSE-8NT2]; see also Analysis of Present State of 
Osaka City per District (Unemployment Rate in 2010), OSAKA CITY GOV’T, 
https://www.city.osaka.lg.jp/toshikeikaku/page/0000249886.html 
[https://perma.cc/H3VK-N7ZH]. 
 101  See Neighborhood Unemployment: A Technical Note, BOSTON PLAN. & DEV. 
AGENCY RES. DIVISION; Unemployment in Boston, BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT 
AUTHORITY/RES. DIVISION, supra note 100.  This is particularly true in the city’s B3, 
B2, and northwest C11 sectors.  Braga et al., supra note 2, at 49.  See also Boston Police 
Stations, Boston Open Data, http://bostonopendata-boston.opendata.arcgis.com/
datasets/e5a0066d38ac4e2abbc7918197a4f6af_6/data [https://perma.cc/K5PW-
TGKU]. 
 102 See Neighborhood Unemployment: A Technical Note, BOSTON PLAN. & DEV. 
AGENCY RES. DIVISION; Unemployment in Boston, BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT 
AUTHORITY/RES. DIVISION, supra note 100; Braga et al., supra note 2, at 49. 
 103  Overarching meta-data reveals the expansive and dispersed nature of 
murder across Japanese cities, as opposed to the high concentration of murders in 
the analyzed U.S. cities.  See Changes of Numbers of Serious Crimes per Year, OSAKA 
PREFECTURAL POLICE, https://www.police.pref.osaka.lg.jp/seikatsu/hanzai/
4228.html; [https://perma.cc/GR2S-N22D]; Ryuji Kutsuzawa et al., The Impact of 
Crime on Housing Land Prices and the Effects of Police Boxes and Voluntary Groups on 
Crime Prevention in Japan 32 (Kwansei Gakuin University, Discussion Paper No. 60, 
2010). 
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more pervasive throughout the city landscape.104  Osaka city police 
categorizes murder within the nomenclature of “brutal crime,” a 
classification under which the authorities report all brutal crimes 
jointly.  This definitional umbrella includes crimes like murder, 
robbery with assault, rape, and arson.105  The total reported brutal 
crimes within the city limits in 2016 was 342.106  This makes the rate 
of brutal crimes 2.137 per 100,000 individuals. 107   Through data 
estimates,108 the total number of murders within the city of Osaka is 
projected to be approximately 30, which would convey a rate of 1.1 
murders per 100,000 individuals—significantly above the 
prefecture’s average of 0.55; in the same way that Boston's 7.27 
murders place above the Massachusetts state average of 1.9.109  The 
state of murder in Osaka city also situates the metropolis well above 
the national average of 0.28 murders per 100,000 individuals. 
A socioeconomic and criminal analysis of Osaka’s 
neighborhoods reveals that criminal activity in general, and murder 
in particular, are (i) low in comparison to Boston, and (ii) spread 
almost equally throughout the city, without attending considerably 
to factors of geographical accumulation of wealth.110  In fact, the area 
 
 104 Koban Index, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, https://www.police.pref.osaka.
jp/04shikumi/koban/index.html [https://perma.cc/73FM-5PRP] (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2019) (showing the iterations of police boxes every several city blocks).  See 
generally sources cited infra notes 250, 251. 
 105  See Numbers of Acknowledgment of Crime, per Crimes, per 
Cities/Wards/Towns/Villages, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, https://www.police.pref.
osaka.lg.jp/material/files/group/2/h30_09.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QPB-FVKK] 
[hereinafter Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka]. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Calculations are made in accordance with a total population of 2,714,497 
residents.  Profile of Osaka City, OSAKA CITY, https://www.city.osaka.lg.jp/
contents/wdu020/enjoy/en/overview/content_CityProfile.html 
[https://perma.cc/HJ89-M8U4] (last updated Oct. 1, 2019). 
 108  The Osaka Prefecture police provide a breakdown of brutal crimes in 
which rapes and murders are included within the same category.  The rape 
numbers for Japan in 2016 were 989, while there were 895 murders (including 
attempts)—and in the Osaka Prefecture there were 110 murders and 100 rapes.  
Observing the approximate 10% difference between rapes and murders both in 
Japan as well as in Osaka, the estimate assumed to pursue this calculation is that of 
a conservative 0.40 murders per 0.60 rapes.  See Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra 
note 105. 
 109 Id. 
 110  The accumulation of criminal activity in the areas most affected by 
inequality is not as significant, nor as exclusively centrifugal, as it is in Boston.  
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with the most crimes is a commercial ward, and the offenses 
perpetrated tend to be property crimes.111  These crimes occur in the 
Chūō-ku district, in which the income is higher than average for the 
city.112  When shifting the focus to other neighborhoods, the analysis 
reveals a confirmation of this pattern.  The district with the most 
brutal crimes resulting in murder is Kita, which reports higher than 
average income for the city, and also reports some of the lowest 
levels of unemployment—sustaining an estimated 4.8 murders per 
100,000 residents.113  Next, with 1.6 estimated murders per 100,000 
residents, are the districts of Tenoji, (the richest district in the city, 
and again, in the lowest bracket of unemployment),114 and Ikuno 
and Naniwa (both with average household income, and average and 
lower than average unemployment rates respectively). 115   The 
murder rates then diminish to estimates of 1.2 per 100,000 for the 
commercial district of Chūō-ku.116  In fact, Nishinari, which is the 
district with the lowest income within the city limits, as well as the 
most unemployment of all of Osaka city, holds this same reported 
record of an estimated 1.2 murders per 100,000 residents.117  It is 
worth mentioning that Nishinari is the district with the second 
highest count of brutal crimes with 47 (after the commercial district 
of Chūō-ku with 56), but most of them involve robbery.118  The rest 
 
Crime conglomeration in Osaka is constrained to property crime, and in fact, 
murder does not follow this trend of partial symmetry at all.  See Statistic Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs & Communications of Japan, National Census (2010) 
[hereinafter Japanese Census]; OSAKA PREFECTURE, Changes of the Rate of Public 
Assistance (reference material in the third meeting of the Council of Establishment 
of Special Wards in Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City) (Apr. 26, 2013) [hereinafter 
Public Assistance Rates]; Hatena Blog, GEO_SEABOOK (May 5, 2018), https://cdn-
ak.f.st-hatena.com/images/fotolife/g/geo_seabook/20180505/20180505
205838.png [https://perma.cc/ZQ5S-M5DN] [hereinafter Hatena Blog]; 
Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105. 
 111 See Japanese Census, supra note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note 
110; Hatena Blog, supra note 110; Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105. 
 112 See Japanese Census, supra note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; 
Hatena Blog, supra note 110; Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105. 
 113 See Japanese Census, supra note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; 
Hatena Blog, supra note 110; Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105. 
 114 See Hatena Blog, supra note 110. 
 115 See Japanese Census, supra note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; 
Hatena Blog, supra note 110; Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105. 
 116 See Japanese Census, supra note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; 
Hatena Blog, supra note 110; Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105. 
 117 See Japanese Census, supra note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note 
110; Hatena Blog, supra note 110; Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105. 
 118 See Acknowledged Crimes in Osaka, supra note 105. 
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of the city, including average and above average income districts, 
vary between no murders and 0.4 murders per 100,000 residents in 
general.119 
The above paragraph does not intend to assert absolutely that 
Osaka is a metropolis without contrasts in what pertains to 
socioeconomic divergences.  Both the city of Osaka and the 
prefecture surpass the national average of residents receiving 
welfare, albeit while being one of the nation’s most prominent 
capital-generating engines—and though the dispersion of said 
welfare benefits tends to be generally diffused throughout the 
districts, there are several pockets of poverty concentration like the 
Nishinari or Naniwa districts. 120   The average rate of welfare 
recipients in Japan tends to be between 10 and 20 individuals per 
1,000 during periods of economic stability. 121   However, at a 
prefectural level, within the last decade, Osaka has increased its 
welfare recipients to rates that are above 30 individuals per 1,000.  In 
2011, the average number of recipients in Japan was 16.4 per 1,000 
compared to 33.9 in Osaka’s Prefecture.122  In recent history, the city 
itself has also increased its necessity for governmental assistance 
steadily.  In the last two decades Osaka city has incremented its 
welfare recipients from those similar to national averages, 
oscillating between 10 to 16 individuals per every 1,000, to having 
above 50 residents per 1,000 in need of benefit programs.123  Many 
of the above-mentioned districts like Naniwa and Ikuno receive 
assistance that is significantly above average (103.8 and 73.1 per 
1,000, respectively). 124   A special mention, again, is required for 
 
 119 Id. 
 120 See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; see also Regional Information: 
Osaka, JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORG., https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/
region/osaka/ [https://perma.cc/MU2X-JKNU] (last visited June 16, 2020). 
 121 See Poverty Research Seminar, supra note 58; Public Assistance Rates, supra 
note 110; Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110.  Welfare recipiency in Japan stood 
at approximately 25 per 1,000 individuals in the post-war era, moving into 
standards oscillating between 15 and 5 since then, and until an abrupt variance 
immediately following the 2008 crisis, where welfare recipient rates would ascend 
to 25 per 1,000 once again. 
 122 See Poverty Research Seminar, supra note 58; Public Assistance Rates, supra 
note 110. 
 123 See Poverty Research Seminar, supra note 58; Public Assistance Rates, supra 
note 110. 
 124 See Poverty Research Seminar, supra note 58; Public Assistance Rates, supra 
note 110. 
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Nishinari, which has received welfare assistance at rates of 234.7 per 
1,000 district residents.125  The most relevant derived data for the 
purposes of this analysis is that, despite the signals of poverty (or 
more accurately, of public intervention to prevent poverty), these 
figures don’t seem to translate into higher murder rates in the 
disproportionately affected districts—as they do in Boston.  The data 
also reinforces the assumption that in Osaka, individuals with 
different levels of wealth live in comparatively integrated locations, 
with districts housing economically diverse population, unlike in 
Boston.  In fact, Tennoji, the city’s wealthiest district as it pertains to 
income per capita, still had a number of residents above the national 
average that qualified to receive government assistance (at 23.6 per 
1,000) in 2012.126  Overall, the unemployment rate in Osaka, like that 
of Boston, has been decreasing throughout the last decade.  In 2019, 
the professional inactivity indicators stabilized at 3.2%—a 
recovering standard from previous years, as in 2016 the city suffered 
4% unemployment rates, and in 2013 the city sustained a 4.8% 
rate.127 
Singularly pertinent to this examination of the location of 
murder in Osaka, and a key structural difference with Boston, is the 
geographical disposition and arrangement of the police forces.  
Police stations (hereinafter referred to as “koban”) in Osaka are 
allocated throughout the city.  In Boston there are 12 police stations, 
outlying the communities they serve; whereas in Osaka there are 649 
koban, and they are spread all throughout the neighborhoods in an 
almost ubiquitous manner, iterating every several city blocks. 128  
Nishinari alone, the poorest district of Osaka, has twelve of these 
koban.129  Tenoji, the richest, has seven.130  For comparison, Ikuno 
 
 125 See Poverty Research Seminar, supra note 58; Public Assistance Rates, supra 
note 110. 
 126 See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110. 
 127 Employment Statistics Report (Yearly Average), OSAKA PREFECTURAL GOV’T, 
http://www.pref.osaka.lg.jp/toukei/roucho_n/index.html [perma.cc/Q2AW-
CRMU] (last visited Apr. 19, 2019). 
 128 Koban Index, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, supra note 104. 
 129 Koban index: Nishinari, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, https://www.police.
pref.osaka.lg.jp/sogo/keisatsusyo/1/6323.html [https://perma.cc/C8V4-AEV6] 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2019). 
 130  Koban index: Tenoji, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, https://www.police.
pref.osaka.lg.jp/sogo/keisatsusyo/1/6332.html [https://perma.cc/44B3-CXK9] 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2019). 
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has ten, Chūō-ku has nine, and Naniwa eight.131  Kita, the district 
with the most estimated murders, has only four. 132   This 
geolocational structuring and spatial distribution of police resources 
presents a disjunctive organizational model.  In Boston, police 
stations are far more geographically isolated and diffused; whereas 
in Osaka, koban are spatially pervasive—necessarily inserting 
themselves into the geographic heart of neighborhood social and 
economic interactions. 
This Paper will now examine more closely the potential analytic 
value and translatability of the high-crime micro-unit thesis.  The 
hot spot theory posits that the analysis of gun violence and murder 
is better understood through the lens of (i) specific locations in 
which crime will gather, and (ii) specific concentric social groups 
that perpetrate them.133  The first hypothesis of crime presented by 
the hot spot theory (geographic concentration of murder) does not 
hold up to a comparative analysis with the city of Osaka.  This is due 
to the fact that crime in general, and murders in particular, are 
spread across the Japanese city with significantly less 
conglomeration than in Boston.  Criminal accounts of murder 
appear to be arrayed subject to factors that are not dictated by, or 
subject to, the socioeconomic situation of their residents, unlike in 
Boston.   
The second foundational claim of the hot spots theory is the 
prediction that murders will be highly concentrated in relation to its 
enacting agents.134  By observing the highly limited group of people 
perpetrating murders in Boston, the hot spot theory projects that 
murders are disproportionately committed by a small, concentrated, 
and concentric group of people that operates within the same 
cohesive network of crime.135  Osaka’s murder patterns defeat this 
prong of the theory as well.  The reason for the lack of translatability 
is that, in Osaka city and prefecture, there is almost no recidivism.  
In fact, recidivism is so low in Japan that by 2005, only five cases of 
 
 131  Koban index: Ikuno, Chūō-ku, and Naniwa, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, 
https://www.police.pref.osaka.jp [https://perma.cc/PN3N-V4UP] (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2019). 
 132  Koban index: Kita, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, https://www.police.
pref.osaka.lg.jp/sogo/keisatsusyo/1/6346.html [https://perma.cc/44B3-CXK9] 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2019). 
 133 See Braga et al., supra note 2, at 48. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
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murder from the last 1,768 presented recidivism.136  This may be due 
to the fact that murders are generally spontaneous and occur 
principally in the context of trivial disputes—except in highly 
unlikely anomalies like murders perpetrated by the Yakuza crime 
organizations.137  Specifically, in the Osaka Prefecture in 2017, there 
were a total of 106 murders.138  For these 106 murders, there were 
103 different individuals arrested. 139   In 2018, there were 114 
murders and 114 different individuals arrested; 140  statistics that 
exhibit a high disparity with the high concentration of perpetrators 
present in Boston. 
In conclusion, Boston and Osaka present vastly different 
narrative scenarios pertaining to their states of murder—both 
regarding location dispersion, as well as the individuals that 
perform it.  This is because in Boston (i) murders are acutely 
concentrated in their geographical allocation, and (ii) the criminal 
action of intentional homicide is realized by a small group of 
perpetrators—in particular, located within the geographical spaces 
most disproportionately affected by inequality, which suffer the 
lowest income, display the highest unemployment rates, and 
comprise lower geographical distribution of integrated-stationed 
police.  By contrast, in Osaka (i) murder is spread proportionately 
and uniformly throughout the city, (ii) with near non-existent levels 
of recidivism—and criminal activity mapping does not attend to the 
particular socioeconomic factors of wealth distribution, as crime 
 
 136 See Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, supra note 6, at 334. 
 137 Id.  The stable decrease of gun violence in Japan is accompanied by, and 
consequent to, the strengthening of policies and the reinforcement of legal 
constrictions surrounding the nation’s organized crime collectives and networks 
(also known as Yakuza or Boryokudan), which disproportionately concentrated 
murders and gun violence.  See generally DAVID E. KAPLAN & ALEC DUBRO, YAKUZA: 
JAPAN’S CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD (2003); MIYAZAKI MANABU, TOPPAMONO: OUTLAW. 
RADICAL. SUSPECT. MY LIFE IN JAPAN’S UNDERWORLD (2005); PETER B. E. HILL, THE 
JAPANESE MAFIA: YAKUZA, LAW, AND THE STATE (2006); EIKO MARUKO SINIAWER, 
RUFFIANS, YAKUZA, NATIONALISTS: THE VIOLENT POLITICS OF MODERN JAPAN, 1860-
1960 (2008); Bruce A. Gragert, Yakuza: The Warlords of Japanese Organized Crime, 4 
ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 147 (1997); Jake Adelstein, Crime Report Suggests the 
Yakuza are Evolving, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 1, 2015), https://www.japan
times.co.jp/news/2015/08/01/national/media-national/crime-report-suggests-
yakuza-evolving/#.XnXzH2hKhPY [https://perma.cc/UK4C-N674].  See NAT’L 
POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN 31 (2018), https://www.npa.go.jp/english/
Police_of_Japan/Police_of_Japan_2018_full_text.pdf [https://perma.cc/TCH4-
AV62] (referencing unlawful gun possession). 
 138 See Changes of Numbers of Serious Crimes per Year, supra note 103. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
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mobility and dispersion are much more ubiquitous and 
geographically equitable, and police presence geolocation is 
significantly diffused throughout neighborhoods, and integrated 
within them.  Further, not only is the geographical organization of 
crime divergent between these two cities, but the difference between 
the resulting murder rates is also critical.  In Boston, the murder 
rates are significantly higher than in Osaka.  However, this does not 
necessarily deny the hot spots theory, or imply its comprehensive 
failure.  One likely explanation inferred from the data may be that 
of a categorical inapplicability of the theory at cross-cultural, 
international, or multi-city systemic scopes—at least in what refers 
to Japan generally, and Osaka in particular.  A second explanation 
may reveal that Japan is ahead of the curve in murder prevention—
that the hot spots theory may not be applicable because it has 
already been resolved through the resolution of structurally 
differential elements like (i) geographic socioeconomic integration, 
and (ii) equitable areal distribution of police or other conflict-
resolution and safety resources.  This proposition of a post-hot spot 
scenario is a potential interpretation of the data if socioeconomic 
factors of inequality, and localization of poverty and 
unemployment, are believed to play a role in the increase or 
decrease of murder rates within a community.  Osaka does not 
present these trends (geographically demarcated inequality and lack 
of police presence in the areas most affected by inequality) with the 
intensity that Boston does, and consequently presents lower murder 
rates.  In other words, the hot spots theory may be applicable, 
accounting for the fundamental socioeconomic difference between 
Osaka and Boston—which is that of the disproportionate affectation 
of particular geographic pockets by economic inequality, 
unemployment, and poverty in Boston; an inequity phenomenon 
that does not exist at the same scale in Osaka—and which is perhaps 
preemptively resolved by effective welfare systems that prevent 
inequality conglomeration, strengthen socioeconomic 
neighborhood integration, and promote geographical dilation of 
social safety resources (including the police).  At a resource 
allocation level, the territorial ubiquity of police presence is a crucial 
structural distinction in murder prevention activity between the two 
cities, which in Osaka seems conducive to significantly lower levels 
of murder, and a lack of its geographical localization in 
socioeconomically depressed hot spots.  Pervasive police presence, 
or that of other social safety resources, paired with higher 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
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socioeconomic integration across neighborhoods, may (i) reduce 
overall rates of crime and murder, and (ii) prevent the localization 
of crime both geographically and in those who commit it. 
3.3. New York and Tokyo 
This section will engage in a comparative analysis of another two 
cities: New York and Tokyo.  The evaluation of the state of murder 
will follow the framework utilized in the prior section.  This 
contrastive control segment will examine the dynamics of murder in 
both New York and Tokyo, and how they are integrated and 
interrelate with their geographically-dependent standing, 
sociodemographic environment, and with the conditions and 
infrastructural deployment of the cities’ respective police forces.  
Once potential patterns regarding the geolocation of murders are 
discerned within the larger sociodemographic and policing 
framework, the applicable capabilities of the hot spot theory will be 
assessed. 
In 2016, New York state ranked thirtieth out of fifty states in the 
United States for the lowest murder rate, with 3.2 intentional 
homicides per 100,000 residents.141  These numbers were not only 
below the national average of 5.4, but also under the Northeast 
regional average of 3.5.142  In 2017, New York state’s rate was that of 
2.8 murders per 100,000 residents, continuing a downward trend 
that had been ongoing since the State exhibited rates of 4.5 in 2010.143  
This progression has left New York state’s murder rates almost 
unrecognizable from the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the 
standards had stabilized between 10 and 15 murders per 100,000 
residents—numbers to which New York City contributed 
considerably.144  During the 1990s, the rates dropped from averages 
of over 14 murders per 100,000 people at the beginning of the decade 
and normalized at rates that approximated 5 by the decade’s 
 
 141 Crime in the United States by Region, Geographic Division, and State, 2015-2016, 
supra note 82. 
 142 Id.  For a more focused analysis of gun violence in New York, see discussion 
supra note 85. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Crime in the United States by Region, Geographic Division, and State, 2016-2017, 
FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/
topic-pages/tables/table-4 [https://perma.cc/MY8S-QAMM]. 
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conclusion—a trend that would continue throughout the 2000s 
(with rates above 4) and into the 2010s, reaching historic all-time 
lows in recent years with average rates approximating 3 murders 
per 100,000 individuals.145  
New York City has seen an almost constant decrease in murders 
throughout the last decade, achieving a murder rate of 3.9 per 
100,000 residents in 2017—under the national average, but over the 
regional average.146  In 2018, there were a total of 295 murders in the 
city, a significant decrease of 56.17% from 673 murders in 2000, after 
a historic low of 292 in 2017.147  However, most recently, this trend 
appears to be destabilizing, as “[m]ore than 300 people were 
murdered in 2019, [for] an increase of nearly 8% compared with 
2018, and the highest number in three years, according to police 
statistics.”148 
In 2016, Tokyo Prefecture had a total of 80 murders, for a rate of 
0.629 murders per 100,000 individuals.149  In 2017, the number of 
 
 145  Seven Major Felony Offenses, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/
nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/historical-crime-data/seven-
major-felony-offenses-2000-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8SS-JMNG]; N.Y. STATE 
DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., NEW YORK STATE CRIME REPORT (2019), 
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/Crime-in-NYS-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S6UR-DGKP]. 
 146 Seven Major Felony Offenses, N.Y.P.D., supra note 145. 
 147 Seven Major Felony Offenses, N.Y.P.D., supra note 145. 
 148 Edgar Sandoval, The Truth About New York’s Rising Murder Numbers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/us/politics/nypd-
crime-stats.html [https://perma.cc/B2RP-JFBR].  See also Seven Major Felony 
Offenses, N.Y.P.D., supra note 145.  The N.Y.P.D. has linked this uptick in murder 
with gang violence.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Daniel C. Richman, Understanding 
Recent Spikes and Longer Trends in American Murders, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2017); 
Ben Chapman & Katie Honan, Gang-Related Crimes Drive Up Murders, Shootings in 
New York City, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gang-
related-crimes-drive-up-murders-shootings-in-new-york-city-11573080007 
[https://perma.cc/MNB2-NMV8]; Ben Chapman, NYPD Says Gangs Involved in 
Recent Brooklyn Shootings, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 6, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/nypd-says-gangs-involved-in-recent-brooklyn-
shootings-11565121460 [https://perma.cc/C5LN-DVEC]; Tina Moore & Aaron 
Feis, NYC’s Murder Rate Rises Due to Gang Violence, N.Y. POST (July 10, 2018), 
https://nypost.com/2018/07/10/nycs-murder-rate-rises-due-to-gang-violence/ 
[https://perma.cc/9MAG-4HXA]; Thomas Tracy, Gangs Tied to 49 Percent of 
Shootings in New York City, Mostly Over Petty Disputes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 13, 
2015), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/gangs-represent-
shootings-new-york-city-article-1.2464740 [https://perma.cc/663A-VNW9]. 
 149 “Hasseijyokyo/Tokei” Metropolitan Police Department Crime Statistics, TOKYO 
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, https://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/smph/
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murders in Tokyo increased to 99, averaging 0.72 murders per 
100,000 citizens within the city limits150—situating itself above the 
national average of 0.2.151  Despite this recent slight upturn, Tokyo’s 
murder rates have been continuously declining throughout recent 
history—during the last decade, the total murders for the Tokyo 
Prefecture stabilized between 80 and 126. 152   Although the city 
places above the national average rates, Tokyo (like Osaka) made it 
into the 2017 ranking of The Economist’s list of the Safe Cities Index.  
Osaka occupied the third place on the list with an overall safety 
score of 88.87, while Tokyo was ranked as the safest city in the world 
with a score of 89.80. 153  New York is ranked twenty-first, with a 
score of 81.01, and Boston does not appear in the list.154 
As established in prior sections, the high-crime micro-unit 
theory focuses on the recurrence of murder in specific locations and 
the repeated identity of a small group of perpetrators.  The section 
will now proceed to analyze the extent to which the theses that this 
model is predicated upon can be applied to the cities of New York 
and Tokyo.  To better understand both cities’ murder rates in a 
broader and integrated public context, an analysis of its relationship 
with selected socioeconomic indicators from New York is necessary.  
In 2014, N.Y.’s metropolitan area ranked second-highest in income 
inequality in the United States, behind only Connecticut.155  As a 
city, New York ranked as the tenth most affected by wealth disparity 
 
about_mpd/jokyo_tokei/index.html [https://perma.cc/K9S9-HMUC] (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2019). 
 150  See Statistics of Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department in 2017, Tokyo 
Metropolitan Police Dep’t, https://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/about_mpd/
jokyo_tokei/tokei/k_tokei29.files/ktd033.pdf [https://perma.cc/42HP-Y4MM] 
[hereinafter 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics]. 
 151 Intentional Homicides, supra note 7; Japan, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, supra 
note 1. 
 152 Tokyo’s murder count of 126 took place in 2014 (the highest since 2008, and 
until measured by this study).  “Hasseijyokyo/Tokei” Metropolitan Police Department 
Crime Statistics, supra note 149. 
 153  This ranking analyzes and measures cities’ overall safety and creates 
indexes attending to indicators such as personal security, infrastructure security, 
health security, and digital security.  THE ECONOMIST, supra note 89. 
 154 Id.  (regarding personal security (which includes violent crime and murder) 
Osaka ranked as the 3rd safest in the world, with a score of 91.59, Tokyo ranked 4th 
with a score of 91.57, and New York ranked 25th, scoring 80.89). 
 155  City and Metropolitan Inequality on the Rise, Driven by Declining Incomes, 
BROOKINGS INST., supra note 92. 
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in the United States with a 14.1 income inequality ratio.156  In 2019, 
the New York metropolitan area remained second to Bridgeport, CT, 
in disproportionate capital distribution; while N.Y.C. ranked eighth 
amongst American cities with an inequality rate of 14.7—following 
an upward trend in wealth disparity.157  A closer look at the actual 
socioeconomic divide in New York City in terms of Gini coefficients 
reveals a much more complex truth, as the rates signal an inequality 
that stands at 0.5136—above the already comparatively high 
national average of 0.415.158  For the last decade, approximately one 
in five New Yorkers have lived in relative poverty, and almost half 
of the households are considered poor or living in near-poverty 
conditions.159  Relative poverty rates in N.Y.C. affect roughly 20% of 
the population, and are therefore higher than the national average 
of 12%. 160   Two sentences that grippingly capture the levels of 
inequality in N.Y.C. are the following: “One in five New Yorkers 
lives below the poverty line, while the top 5% of Manhattanites 
earned more than $860,000 in 2014,” 161  and “[a] census tract 
bordering Central Park in the Upper East Side has a median 
household income greater than $200,000, while just blocks away in 
East Harlem, household income is under $16,000.”162  It is safe to 
assume that New York’s wealth disparity and income inequality are 
 
 156 Id. 
 157 City and Metropolitan Income Inequality Data Reveal Ups and Downs Through 
2016, BROOKINGS INST., supra note 94. 
 158  Alexandre Tanzi & Wei Lu, Income Inequality Grows in NYC Area, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-
11/have-and-the-have-nots-divide-increases-in-new-york-new-york 
[https://perma.cc/Q6B7-ZWQC]. 
 159  Wealth Divides, ESRI, https://storymaps.esri.com/stories/2016/wealth-
divides/index.html  [https://perma.cc/TW48-MX7N] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019). 
 160  OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, N.Y. CITY GOV’T, NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT 
POVERTY MEASURE 2005-2016 (2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/opportunity/
pdf/18_poverty_measure_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ22-HX9R] (reporting 
poverty rates by borough over various years) [hereinafter Poverty Measure 2005-
2016]; NEW YORK MAYOR’S OFFICE FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, Poverty Measure, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/opportunity/poverty-in-nyc/poverty-measure.page 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/Q95L-3A44]; CENTER FOR NEW YORK 
AFFAIRS, Inequality and Poverty, http://www.centernyc.org/inequality-poverty 
[https://perma.cc/S76H-BGL9] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019) (explaining how wages 
among low-income people in New York have stagnated); see also discussion supra 
Section 2. 
 161 Wealth Divides, ESRI, supra note 159. 
 162 Id. 
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substantial—and this unequal distribution of wealth is significantly 
geographically determined, subject to strictly partitioned areal 
demarcations. 
In Manhattan, in particular in the south of the island and in the 
upper east and upper west ends, yearly income per household is 
generally above $100,000.163  However, in the Bronx and sectors of 
Southwest Brooklyn, income tends to be under $20,000.164  In New 
York City, the locations affected negatively by inequality (those in 
which poverty rates and unemployment are most intense) coincide 
with the geographical locus of a higher concentration of murders.165  
Historical relative poverty rates in the Bronx stabilized around the 
25% mark, reaching 27.5% in 2015. 166   In Brooklyn, these rates 
peaked for the decade in 2012, with 22.3% poverty; decreasing to 
20.5% households in poverty in 2016.167  Comparatively, Manhattan 
had poverty rates of 13.9% that same year.168 
Like poverty, unemployment in New York City tends to 
accumulate in sectors of Brooklyn and the Bronx as well.  After 
reaching levels of over 10% consequent to the 2008 economic 
collapse, unemployment in N.Y.C. is now stable at around 4%.169  
Labor inactivity rates for the city are comparable to national 
averages, though they are lower than the regional average, which in 
2019 settled at about 10%. 170   The Bronx and Brooklyn show 
unemployment rates above the city average, but lower than that of 
the regional average.  In 2014 the Bronx suffered 10% 
unemployment, which descended to 7.1% in 2016, and in 2019 rested 
 
 163 See Andy Kiersz, Here’s a Block-By-Block Look at Who’s Making How Much 
Across NYC’s 5 Boroughs, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.business
insider.com/new-york-city-income-maps-2014-12 [https://perma.cc/U3QN-
M2EQ] [hereinafter NYC Block-by-Block Look]. 
 164 Id. 
 165 See N.Y.C. Crime Map, infra note 181; discussion supra note 22. 
 166 Poverty Measure 2005-2016, supra note 160. 
 167 See Poverty Measure 2005-2016, supra note 160. 
 168 See Poverty Measure 2005-2016, supra note 160. 
 169 Labor Statistics for the New York City Region: Revised 2014-2018 Borough Labor 
Force Data, N.Y. ST., https://www.labor.ny.gov/stats/nyc/ 
[https://perma.cc/SAK3-LN2H] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019) (listing basic labor 
statistics for N.Y.C. over various years). 
 170 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: 2018 ANNUAL SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT, www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/techdocs/
cpsmar18.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRX5-TXKA] (last visited Apr. 17, 2019). 
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at 5.6%. 171   In Brooklyn, a county that doubles the Bronx in 
population and exhibits more economic diversity, unemployment 
rates have descended from around 8% in 2014, to an average of 4.2% 
in 2018.172  The areas of N.Y.C. where the most murders occur are 
the areas most affected by inequality, including certain parts of the 
Bronx and Brooklyn which in turn exhibit the lowest income and the 
highest unemployment rates. 173   This data shows higher 
unemployment rates in murder-concentration areas than in the 
comprehensive city dynamics, though absent significant contrast; 
and it also signals a continuous descent, which has generally been 
accompanied by a decline in murder rates as well.174  
Though crime rates are the highest in the “Manhattan South 
Precinct,” most are against property—only two murders occurred 
throughout 2018 in this location.  This pattern resembles Osaka’s 
Chūō-ku district with its  high-in-crime but low-in-murder trends.175  
In New York City, murder locations are both progressively reducing 
and, unlike in Osaka, consolidating.  In recent years, many precincts 
in New York have had between 0 and 2 murders.  However, there 
are certain precincts that report disproportionate murder rates.176 
As stated above, murders in N.Y.C. are concentrated 
geographically in very specific locations,177 and these locations also 
tend to be the areas of the city most affected by inequality. 178  
Murder is intensively condensed in areas of the Bronx and areas of 
Southwest Brooklyn.  The Bronx precincts, in 2018, saw 81 of the 
 
 171 Labor Statistics for the New York City Region: Revised 2014-2018 Borough Labor 
Force Data, supra note 169. 
 172 Id. 
 173 See N.Y.C. Crime Map, infra note 181; NYC Block-by-Block Look, supra note 
163. 
 174 The recurring nature of this data point in the U.S., Boston, and N.Y.C., may 
suggest that employed people (or people with access to a stable, legal source of 
income) are less likely to participate in murder.  Id. See also discussion infra note 207. 
 175 See discussion supra Section 3.2. 
 176  Seven Major Felony Offenses: By Precinct 2000-2019, N.Y.P.D., 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/h
istorical-crime-data/seven-major-felony-offenses-by-precinct-2000-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WE95-2W99]. 
 177 See N.Y.C. Crime Map, infra note 181; NYC Block-by-Block Look, supra note 
163. 
 178 Id. 
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city’s 252 total murders.179   This means that 32% of the murders 
occurred in the Bronx, where only 17% of the population lives.180  In 
particular, the 42nd, 48th, 32nd, and 40th police precincts recorded 
murder rates per 100,000 individuals of 18.81, 15.61, 16.92, and 13.12 
respectively, specifically conglomerating in Belmont and East 
Tremont (which suffer poverty rates of 30.3%) and areas between 
Concourse and High Bridge (sustaining poverty rates of 32.4%).181  
Accompanying these northern Harlem and Bronx precincts in 
murder concentration rates is a small cluster of precincts within 
South Brooklyn.  In this area, 5 out of the 133 city-wide precincts 
accounted for 16% of all murders in 2018—specifically affected were 
the 77th, 73rd, and 79th precincts, with respective murder rates of 
18.73, 18.5, and 15.51 murders per 100,000 individuals. 182   These 
murders cluster in areas of Crown Heights and Brownsville, which 
suffer the highest poverty rates in Brooklyn with 29.4%.183  A quick 
glance at crime maps provided by the New York City Government 
provides an insightful understanding of how disproportionate the 
situation is in terms of the geographical accumulation of murder, 
and how it correlates with geographically-demarcated inequality.184 
Unlike New York, Tokyo shows some of the same tendencies as 
Osaka: murders are spread throughout the city and do not seem to 
attend to socioeconomic disparities manifested in the form of 
wealth.  First, while New York’s disparity is heavily dependent 
upon geographical conditions, Tokyo does not have the same 
 
 179  Id. See also Precincts, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/
bureaus/patrol/precincts-landing.page [https://perma.cc/Y8HR-4GKC] (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2019); Seven Major Felony Offenses, N.Y.P.D., supra note 145. 
 180 In 2018, 1,432,132 people lived in the Bronx, out of the City’s 8,398,748 total 
residents.  QuickFacts: Bronx County Bronx Borough), New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/bronxcountybronxboroughnewy
ork/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/MRX5-TXKA] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019). 
 181 These rates are calculated for dates between January 2019 and April 2020, 
in accordance to the N.Y.C. Crime Map statistics provided by N.Y.C..  N.Y.C. Crime 
Map, CITY N.Y. https://maps.nyc.gov/crime/ [https://perma.cc/SRQ6-BVQ8].  
For a contrastive analysis, see the data provided by the city’s Office for Economic 
Opportunity.  CITY OF N.Y., NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT POVERTY MEASURE (2017), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/opportunity/pdf/19_poverty_measure_report.pd
f [https://perma.cc/7KX2-PXAF]. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See N.Y.C. Crime Map, supra note 181.  However, unlike Boston, murders 
tend to congregate around the areas most affected by inequality in general, and not 
necessarily specific streets.  For the analyzed time-frames, geolocational repetition 
is scarce. 
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cleavages in income by district.185  Residential inequalities by district 
that provoke socioeconomic segregation are absent as a result of 
coordinated capitalism, state and urban policy, and work-location 
and commute patterns. 186   This is not to say that there are not 
districts that house the wealthy in Tokyo.  There are indeed income 
inequalities that represent themselves through district and ward 
lines.  However, the differential element of inequality is not based 
strictly on the district in which the residents live rather how much 
space their houses occupy within the district, 187  creating a 
socioeconomically integrated urban wealth network that is unlike 
the heavily economically partitioned New York.  Pertaining to the 
historical trajectory of inequality, wealth disparity amongst districts 
has grown in recent years in both New York and Tokyo, but to a 
different degree.  While income inequality between boroughs 
doubled in New York between 1970 and 2000, Tokyo’s inequality 
among districts grew only 16%.188  Japan is the biggest economy in 
the world with the “most equal wealth distribution,”189 and Tokyo 
follows the same conceptual pattern as a city. 
The city analysis of inequality in New York and Tokyo reveals 
similar patterns as laid out by national trends in the United States 
and Japan respectively.  New York, like the United States, exhibits 
an incremental and linear trend towards increased inequality; while 
in Tokyo, like in Japan, the trend is cyclical and not attached to 
specific geographical delineations, reflective of a more economically 
uniform Japanese society. 190   Inequality in Tokyo becomes most 
 
 185 RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: MAKING SENSE OF 
CONTEXTUAL DIVERSITY (Thomas Maloutas & Kuniko Fujita eds., 2012). 
 186  Residential patterns are necessary when establishing the differences 
between New York’s economic segregation and the comparatively lesser 
socioeconomic partitions encountered in Tokyo’s geolocation of wealth and 
poverty.  Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Kuniko Fujita & Richard Child Hill, Place Stratification in Tokyo and New 
York, MICH. ST. U. (2006), https://msu.edu/user/hillrr/Place%20Stratification%20
Tokyo%20and%20New%20York.pdf [https://perma.cc/N94B-KU5L] (discussing 
urban class segregation in Tokyo and New York).  These discrepancies can also be 
associated to other factors like cost of living variability, among others. 
 189  CREDIT SUISSE RESEARCH INST., GLOBAL WEALTH REPORT 2018 48 (2018), 
[https://perma.cc/LQN4-9JZD] (analyzing the economies and relative wealth of 
several of the world’s major economies, establishing that “Japan has a more equal 
wealth distribution than any other major country”). 
 190 Fujita & Hill, Place Stratification in Tokyo and New York, supra note 188. 
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apparent when comparing the center of the city with the suburbs.  
This means that inequality among districts within the city is not as 
significant as the variance found when the city is compared to its 
metropolitan area, a capital wealth discrepancy that has expanded 
in recent years.  Income inequality ratio between the city center and 
the suburbs of Tokyo has increased from 118% to 137% wealth 
accumulation disparity during this decade, 191   though these 
numbers are still nowhere near the inequality ratios found in New 
York, where a couple blocks can signify a rupturing distance 
between poverty and capital wealth. 192   In essence, on matters 
pertaining to inequality, the main difference that Tokyo presents 
with New York is that, while in New York geographical areas are 
populated by either the rich or the poor, Tokyo’s inequality  is not 
as pronounced and is not as dependent upon geographical 
boundaries.  Tokyo has a social structure in which the inhabitants of 
its residential wards are more socioeconomically integrated 
throughout districts and amongst occupational groups.193 
Moving on to unemployment in Tokyo, rates are currently 
stabilized at 2%—lower than the national average of 2.5%.194  This 
follows a positive trend as the city responded to the 2008 economic 
crisis with an unemployment response that reached 5.5% in 2010.195  
There has been a constant decline in labor inactivity in the city since 
the disruptive effects of the economic downturn, with 2016 seeing a 
3.2% unemployment rate. 196   In the same way that income per 
household does not abruptly diverge by district, Tokyo presents 
more balanced unemployment rates per district than New York.  
Regarding governmental support of the poor, the Tokyo Prefecture, 
like Osaka, required welfare distribution at a higher rate than the 
national average.  The number of Tokyoites who received welfare 
 
 191 Maloutas & Fujita, supra note 185.  See generally James Mayger & Hannah 
Dormido, The Rich Are Getting Richer in Abe’s Japan, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 13, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-japan-inequality/ 
[https://perma.cc/DUR5-39EY]. 
 192 Wealth Divides, ESRI, supra note 159.  See also discussion supra note 188. 
 193 Fujita & Hill, supra note 188. 
 194 “Tokyonoroudouryoku” Employment in Tokyo, Statistics of Tokyo, STAT. DIV. 
BUREAU GEN. AFF., http://www.toukei.metro.tokyo.jp/roudou/rd-index.htm 
[http://perma.cc/4KFD-WHGP] (last visited Apr. 19, 2019). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. (showing 2014’s increased unemployment rate would coincide with the 
only growth in murder rates, increasing nationwide from 370 to 395, then reducing 
again in 2015 to 363 and in 2016 to 362). 
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was 21.2 per 1,000 while the national average was 16.4. 197  
Nonetheless, the need for welfare distribution was relatively 
consistent across Tokyo’s districts.198 
When observing murder counts as a function of the districts in 
which they occurred, it becomes apparent again that, like Osaka and  
unlike Boston and New York, Tokyo’s murders do not strongly 
correspond with socioeconomic indexing elements or their 
corresponding sociodemographic divides.  In other words, murder 
geolocation in Tokyo is not determined by socioeconomic district or 
neighborhood lines like it is in New York.  Tokyo’s District 7 has the 
most murders in the city, but it is also geographically the largest, 
and not disproportionate in terms of income, welfare needs, or 
unemployment when compared with the rest of the city’s districts.  
It is followed in total murder count by District 3 with 13 murders, 
District 6 (11), District 2 (10), District 10 (9), District 4 (7), District 1 
(6), and District 5 (5).199  These murder rates appear proportional to 
size and population density, and do not appear to be 
disproportionately affected or conditioned by socioeconomic 
dynamics.200   District 10 and District 6 have the highest rates of 
welfare recipients in Tokyo, and their murder rates sit amongst the 
districts’ average.  Meanwhile, District 3 is overall the most 
socioeconomically privileged and least affected by inequality in that 
its residents receive below average government assistance in all its 
composing neighborhoods,201 and yet it has more murders than both 
District 10 and District 6.  In other words, District 3, which receives 
comparatively low governmental subsidies and includes the third, 
sixth, and seventh wealthiest wards, out of 23 total, has a higher 
murder rate than districts with socioeconomic indicators that reflect 
higher indexes of poverty.202  This challenges the patterns observed 
in New York and Boston, cities in which the location of murder is 
associated with areas that are more affected by inequality.  These 
observations also confirm the patterns observed in Osaka, where 
 
 197 See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110. 
 198 Id. 
 199 See 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra note 150. 
 200 Id. 
 201 See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra 
note 150. 
 202 See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra 
note 150. 
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murders do not ascribe to socioeconomic beacons of poverty or 
unemployment.  As a useful representation of this dissonance, in 
Tokyo, the highest concentration of wealth based on average income 
per household is in District 1, which includes Minato, Chiyoda, and 
Chuo wards.203  This does not mean that murder disappears entirely 
or are abruptly reduced in comparison to other areas of the city, like 
it tends to signify in New York.  Murder rates in District 1 actually 
remain similar to city averages—suggesting again that murders are 
not determined by the status of geographically demarcated 
socioeconomic inferences.  Another example that corroborates this 
hypothesis can be found by digging deeper into the information 
provided by the case of Tokyo’s District 6.  Some of the 
neighborhoods with the least income per household are located in 
this area.  This district is formed by Adachi, the ward with the lowest 
income per household; Arakawa, which ranks twentieth out of 
Tokyo’s 23 total wards in total wealth per household; and Taito, 
which ranks sixteenth. 204   District 6 is geographically large and 
receives a higher than average proportion of welfare.  Yet, there 
were only 11 murders throughout the district of the total 80 murders 
in the city in 2017, indicating a lack of concentration in communities 
affected by inequality like in the Bronx and Southwest Brooklyn.205  
Police distribution in this Tokyo district is also geographically 
interspersed and, unlike in Boston, police geolocation does not 
appear to correspond to an area’s income.  District 6 has 84 koban, 
compared to District 1’s 76, or District 5’s 44 koban.206 
The analysis of New York and Tokyo provides similar results as 
that of Boston and Osaka.  Murders in New York, like in Boston are 
concentrated in the neighborhoods most affected by inequality, 
while in Tokyo, like in Osaka, murders do not seem to attend to, or 
be as determined by, geographically-conditioned socioeconomic 
divisions.  N.Y.C. conveys signals that it is becoming increasingly 
dissimilar in wealth parity and geographical distribution of 
income—following the same trend as the United States—and with 
this increase in geographically determined inequality, murders 
continue to concentrate in the areas most affected by poverty and 
 
 203 See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra 
note 150. 
 204 See Public Assistance Rates, supra note 110; Housing and Land Survey in 2013, 
MINISTRY INTERNAL AFF. & COMM., www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/Xlsdl.do?sinfid=
000028112135. 
 205 See 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra note 150. 
 206 Id. 
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unemployment.  However, it is worth mentioning for clarity 
purposes that in N.Y.C., this last factor is less determinative than in 
Boston; unemployment rates in the communities in which murders 
are disproportionately perpetrated in New York are higher, but not 
as significantly as they are in Boston.207 
The hot spot theory suggests that the analysis of murders must 
be focused on individual streets and that murders are perpetrated 
by a particularly small group of recurring individuals.  The analysis 
of New York and Tokyo partially disproves the multi-city 
applicability of both elements of this theory.  This Paper will first 
attend to the initial micro-unit thesis prong: geographical 
concentration of murder.  New York responds to the same 
archetypal murder concentration as Boston, but seemingly 
attending to different levels of micro-unit intensity and dispersing 
into broader areal progressions.  Though not an absolute 
contravention of the micro-unit thesis, the data presents further 
pertinency and potential policy value in attending to a 
macroeconomic and dispersed-scale socioeconomic-groupings 
approach to murder, rather than adjusting to a micro-locational lens 
for the purposes of addressing the underlying influencing elements 
to murder.  In confirmation of the micro-unit thesis, murders in 
N.Y.C. appear to be progressively and disproportionately clustering 
into specific precincts, in particular within the areas most affected 
by inequality. 
Tokyo’s data, like Osaka’s, does not leave space for the salvaging 
of potential direct applicability regarding the first prong of the 
micro-unit theory.  Murder in Tokyo occurs in a widespread manner 
throughout the city in a way that  remains unresponsive to 
socioeconomic divergences.  Unlike in N.Y.C., murder patterns in 
Tokyo do not respond to geo-specific socioeconomic disparity 
inferences, and this may be due to the fact that the city is not as 
socioeconomically divided—both regarding general affectations of 
inequality as well as the geographical allocation of inequality.  
Indirectly, however, Tokyo’s murder data does not necessarily 
imply a comprehensive failure of the hot spots theory.  With 
significantly lower murder rates among all districts, the hot spots 
thesis holds potential value in that Tokyo, like Osaka, may be 
 
 207 This brings into question matters not only of unemployment, but of the 
quality of employment available in these geographical enclaves, paired with 
educational restrictions and other accompanying sociodemographic factors. 
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evidence that the problems affecting Boston’s and New York City’s 
comparatively high and geographically condensed murder rates can 
be resolved through appropriate policy design and effective 
implementation.  Just because murder is not as quantitatively 
significant or intensely concentrated in the selected Japanese cities, 
this does not mean that it cannot or could not be.  The current state 
of murder in Tokyo could be conveying that the pertinent policy 
authorities and the police have resolved the issues of murder 
quantity and concentration through appropriate and efficient 
deployment of their capacities, or that social public policies may 
have averted excessive pockets of socioeconomic inequality, 
addressing an underlying causative foundation of murder.  In this 
regard, the suitability of the theory may entail that Tokyo is ahead 
of the policy curve, and the city may have addressed the 
geographical micro-unit problem before it arose by (i) enacting 
policies dedicated to averting socioeconomic inequality or at least 
preventing capital disparity from being intensely area-specific, and 
(ii) spreading its police resources as community-focused safety 
services throughout the city in a comparatively pervasive manner, 
allowing officers to become a part of the communities’ social fabric. 
The second theoretical proposal of the hot spot doctrine is that a 
very small group of individuals will execute most of the gun 
violence and commit most of the murders.  This is not the case in 
New York to the extent it is in Boston.  A 2010 report issued by the 
New York State Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision quantified recidivism rates as follows: only 38% of 
people who were imprisoned for their crime returned to prison in 
N.Y.C.208  The rates within the city were the lowest in the state, as 
upstate New York had recidivism standards of up to 49%.209  The 
crime with the lowest recidivism rate in N.Y.C. was murder with 
13%, followed by manslaughter at 17%.210  In the case of Tokyo, 
recidivism is minimal and follows the general pattern found in 
Japanese national criminal statistics.  Recidivism is almost non-
existent in Japan—by 2005, only five of the prior 1,768 murder cases 
 
 208 Press Release, N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Return Rate 
for Parolees Committing New Felony Crimes Hits Historic Low (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/PressRel/2014/Recidivism_Rates_2010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D42V-5P9Y] 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
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presented recidivism, which was less than 0.3%.211  In Tokyo, for the 
99 murders documented in 2017, 98 different people were 
arrested.212  This data suggests that murder in New York and Tokyo, 
unlike in Boston, is perpetrated by a varying group of individuals.  
Another differential element between Boston and Tokyo which may 
help explain the inapplicability of the hot spot theory to Tokyo is 
that of the underlying human capital patterns to murder and their 
adjacent criminal motivation.  Perhaps in Boston the high-crime 
micro-unit theory is useful because of the purpose of the crime, in 
concomitance with its natural geographically conglomerative 
tendencies.  Gang associations and their derivative violence, which 
the hot spot theory directly points to as a major source of murder, 
are highly concentrated and involve perpetrators operating in 
intensively concentric geographical spaces and social circles.  
However, in Tokyo, perpetrators do not operate in concentrated 
geographical spaces, nor do offenders participate in multiple acts of 
murder.  This may indicate a less significant presence of gang 
activity, a less condensed areal presence of gang activity, or a 
detachment between gang activity and murder.  In turn, this 
potentially signifies that gang activity may be less overall, be less 
visible or impactful on social violence, or that the result of gang 
activity does not manifest in the form of intentional homicide.   
A major structural difference that emanates from both cities’ 
analysis is the divergence among geographical presence of police.  A 
police infrastructural comparison between Tokyo and New York 
reveals the same pattern as that of Boston and Osaka—a 
significantly more integrated police presence in Tokyo than what is 
found in New York.  While New York has 133 precincts, Tokyo 
police spreads its roots deep into every neighborhood with a total of 
1,183 koban. 213   The objective of this profound geographical 
pervasiveness, not only in Tokyo but throughout Japan, is that of 
developing community policing.  Community policing creates a 
 
 211 Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, supra note 6, at 334.  
 212 See 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra note 150. 
 213 “Keishichoudehatarakutowa” Working with the Metropolitan Police Department, 
TOKYO METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, https://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/
saiyo/31/about/no1.html [https://perma.cc/DQ5L-PPZJ] (last  visited Apr. 17, 
2019).  See also Precincts, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/
patrol/precincts-landing.page [https://perma.cc/EB7D-DNCS] (last visited Apr. 
24, 2019); Seven Major Felony Offenses: By Precinct 2000-2019, N.Y.P.D., supra note 
176; NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN, supra note 137, at 7. 
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nexus of identity between individuals and their neighborhood 
police officers, which provides for an integrated and cohesive 
conceptualization between police roles and the socioeconomic 
interactions of the communities they participate in and serve. 214  
Though the New York Police Department has made tremendous 
efforts to pursue similar goals and obtain similar results through its 
neighborhood policing program, “One City: Safe and Fair—
Everywhere,”215 and “build the block” initiatives,216 the difference 
between both nations’ police networks remains predicated upon the 
geographical ubiquity of the Japanese koban against the relatively 
isolated nature of the U.S. police station.  It is entirely possible that, 
among other factors, the initiatives deployed in New York City in 
pursuit of community policing have contributed to the steady 
decline in the city’s murder rates.  However, the New York police 
still lack the geographical dispersion found in Japan, which may 
present barriers to community-policing and its attached social 
integration. 
New York’s state of murder presents a more analogous 
archetype to Braga et al.’s theory than that displayed by Japan’s 
cities, revealing an inherent intra-cultural consistency.  Murders in 
Tokyo remain comparatively lower than both Boston’s and New 
York’s, occurring throughout the city’s landscape, and presenting 
almost non-existent recidivism.  The structural differences found by 
this Paper’s contrastive analysis are related to the spatial 
dissemination and distributive configuration of police resources, 
 
 214 The notion of integrated community policing will be further developed in 
Section 4. 
 215  In 2015, Mayor de Blasio announced the constitution of a program 
projected as a “comprehensive approach designed to fully engage community as 
coequal partner to keep neighborhoods safe, support officers, and keep crime at 
historic low levels.”  The specific strategies set forth by these policies pursue 
community-building through, for example, the “true sector integrity” concept, 
which delegates “the same two officers” to “the same sector every day with the 
potential for an additional two regularly-assigned cars depending on the sector’s 
crime rates.” These policies appear to echo Japanese designs in seeking a deeper 
integration between police and community networks. See Mayor de Blasio, 
Commissioner Bratton Unveil New Groundbreaking Neighborhood Policing Vision, 
N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/440-15/mayor-de-
blasio-commissioner-bratton-new-groundbreaking-neighborhood-policing-
vision#/0 [https://perma.cc/W9RX-8MKG]. 
 216  Neighborhood Policing, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/
bureaus/patrol/neighborhood-coordination-officers.page 
[https://perma.cc/EB7D-DNCS] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); Find Your Build the 
Block Meeting, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/find-
your-meeting.page [https://perma.cc/KRX3-DG4L] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019). 
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and the areal-disjunctive effects of geographically-consolidated 
inequality.  The Japanese cities analyzed in this study present 
community-focused safety services equitably and ubiquitously 
engrained in their neighborhood infrastructural network, and 
remain largely unburdened by the complex socioeconomic and 
geodemographic inequities present in their U.S. counterparts.  And 
it is amidst the neighborhoods most affected by New York’s 
comparatively aggressive wealth disparity that murders 
accumulate, and so do the tragic stories that they bring with them.217   
Without the intent to extrapolate conclusions regarding the 
dynamics of socioeconomic factors, comparative wealth, and their 
interactions with police murder-prevention activity, this Paper 
poses the following premise in order to anticipate and preclude 
murder as the act of an individual, as well as murder as a social 
doing.  Given the recurring nature of unemployment, relative 
poverty, and geodemographically-segregated wealth inequality as 
correlative indicators of higher murder rates in the U.S., and how 
the lessened intensity and geographical concentration of these 
elements in Japan appear to signal macro and micro-level reductions 
in murder rates, it could be projected that access to labor, which 
provides individuals with steady sources of income and with social 
affiliations that disconnect violence (and its consequent murder) 
from capital acquisition, its consequence in wealth attainment 
through lawful means, and its effects on factual and perceived 
geographically-based wealth disparity, may be useful avenues 
through which to approach murder prevention targeted at the 
individual commission of the crime.  Alongside these subject-
focused murder prevention strategies, community-focused safety 
services’ ubiquity and integrated neighborhood geographical 
presence, may act as an aggregate socially preventive layer.218  As a 
consequence to the data gathered in this comparative study, it 
appears that individuals with the structural capability to access a 
stable source of legally-sanctioned income may be less likely to 
participate in murder compared to those who exist within a system 
with more geographically-determined inequality and non-
integrated wealth distribution patterns.  In combination with an 
equal and integrated distribution of safety-related services these 
 
 217 Criminal conglomeration has effects beyond those that are statistical, and 
it seeps into more complex social-conditioning networks. 
 218 The nexus between community policing and the potential implementation 
of a Japanese-style koban model will be addressed further in Section 4. 
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policies seem conducive to more efficient murder-prevention 
strategies, less concentrated murder patterns, lower rates of 
recidivism, and lower murder rates overall. 
4. CONCLUSIONS, POLICE ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Road to Reducing Murder Rates: Socioeconomic Integration and 
Geographical Redistribution of Safety and Conflict-Resolution Resources 
 
In analyzing Boston’s murder patterns, the high-crime micro-
unit (or “hot spot”) theory infers from them that (i) murders are and 
will be substantially and fundamentally geographically 
concentrated, and (ii) that murders will be committed by a small 
recurring number of individuals.  The hot spot thesis may have 
profoundly useful applications in projecting and anticipating 
murders in Boston; however, its potential for extrapolation to other 
cities’ states of murder seems to be rather limited due to two main 
hindrances that arise from its arguments.  First, it is insufficiently 
explanatory; and second, as a result, it lacks inter-city and multi-
cultural translatability. 
The theory’s lack of explanatory value can be found both at a 
geographical level as well as in relation to perpetrator concentration. 
The hot spot thesis does not provide insight as to why extreme 
murder concentration takes place in Boston, or why a concentric and 
reiterative group of people perpetrates the vast majority of the 
murders.219  This renders the micro-unit premise a potentially useful 
reactionary tool to respond to projected iterations of crime, but fails 
to address the underlying causality of the crime itself, making its 
applicability in divergent sociocultural or geodemographic contexts 
 
 219  The hot spot theory provides an indirect—though insufficient—
explanatory thesis to murder as it relates murder to gang activity and gang activity 
to youths in socioeconomically depressed parts of Boston.  However, deferring to 
at-risk youth does not contribute towards murder resolution in its underlying 
causality.  It is worth mentioning too that the World Bank has identified a world-
wide youth violence problem, in particular in areas exposed to high inequality and 
poverty, and with high unemployment among said youth, which may incline them 
to risky behavior such as crime.  WENDY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, 
SUPPORTING YOUTH AT RISK A POLICY TOOLKIT FOR MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 30 
(2008), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/514781468175152614/pdf/
437050WP0ENGLI1YouthAtRisk01PUBLIC1.pdf [https://perma.cc/L55A-TKZB]; 
Urban Violence: A Challenge of Epidemic Proportions, WORLD BANK (Sept. 6, 2016), 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/09/06/urban-violence-a-
challenge-of-epidemic-proportions [https://perma.cc/87KK-7ECW]. 
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inefficient.  A comparative analysis between the conclusions derived 
from Boston’s state of murder, and those presented by the cities of 
New York, Osaka, and Tokyo reveals that the thesis cannot be 
directly expanded into each city’s murder context. 
In both Boston and New York, crime in general,220 and murder 
in particular, tends to concentrate in areas disproportionately 
affected by inequality—areas which exhibit high rates of poverty 
and unemployment.  Inequality in Boston and New York is heavily 
demarcated by neighborhood, and it is within the less 
socioeconomically privileged neighborhoods that murder tends to 
cluster and consolidate.  Moderately varying from Boston’s hyper-
localized state of murder, but ascribing to the same archetypal 
principles, the geographical location of intentional homicides in 
New York is heavily localized in specific neighborhoods within the 
Bronx and Southwest Brooklyn—those most markedly affected by 
socioeconomic disparity.  Pertaining to the perpetrator prong of the 
theory, the commission of murder by cohesive and reiterative 
groups in Boston is comparatively higher than that of New York.  
While in Boston half the murders are committed by 1% of the city’s 
population, New York’s murder recidivism rates are below the 
regional average at 13%, which partially refutes the micro-unit 
thesis.221 
 
 220 In New York, the precinct with the most amount of reported crime is the 
Manhattan South District, which includes Times Square (a commercial/touristic 
area), but these crimes tend to be property-related, given the commercial nature of 
the precinct.  This same pattern is repeated in Osaka’s Chūō-ku, which includes 
Minami (an equally commercial/touristic area).  This could signal an “overflow” 
effect by which crimes and murders that would be committed in Japan’s poorest 
neighborhoods are expulsed to adjacent districts.  However, the pervasive and 
equal nature of murders throughout the districts, the almost non-existent 
recidivism rates, and the lack of connection between murder and cohesive criminal 
group activity, seems to refute this potential hypothesis.  See discussion supra 
Section 3.3. 
 221  However, this data point exclusively focuses on murder—whereas the 
micro-unit thesis, in its analysis of recidivist gun violence perpetrators in Boston, 
seems to have uncovered within Boston a trend that is much grander in scope.  Gun 
violence comprehensively, at a national level, has significantly higher recidivism 
rates than other offenses, especially when compared to non-gun crimes.  The United 
States Sentencing Commission found in a 2019 study that firearm offenders 
recidivate faster (with a median of 17 months for firearm offenders, compared to 22 
months for non-firearm offenders) and at significantly higher rates than non-
firearm offenders (68.1% for firearm offenders, compared to 46.3% for non-firearm 
offenders).  Anthony J. Annucci, Return Rate for Parolees Committing New Felony 
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An analysis of the state of murder in Tokyo and Osaka presents 
a near-antithetical narrative to that projected by the micro-unit 
model, and beyond the scope of what the theory seems to be able to 
directly accomplish.  Delving into the specifics of murder and its 
interrelation with geographic and perpetrator factors, the story that 
unfolds in the selected Japanese cities is radically different than that 
encountered in the United States.  Murders in Tokyo and Osaka are 
quantitatively lower and (i) are not concentrated in any particular 
neighborhood, being much more ubiquitously distributed 
throughout the geographic landscape of the selected cities, and (ii) 
are not committed by a converging, coordinated, or concentric 
group of perpetrators.  First, pertaining to murder areal 
concentration, no one geographic nucleus absorbs a 
disproportionate amount of the murder cases in Osaka or Tokyo like 
Dorchester does in Boston or the Bronx does in New York.  In fact, 
Nishinari, the Osaka neighborhood most affected by inequality, has 
a relatively low murder rate compared to other nearby districts, 
even when contrasted with the city’s wealthier wards.  This pattern 
remains true for Tokyo’s state of murder.  Much like the 
geographical element of the high-crime micro-unit thesis, the 
offender element prong has no possible application in Japan. 222  
 
Crimes Hits Historic Low, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS  AND 
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.doccs.ny.gov/
PressRel/2014/Recidivism_Rates_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/D42V-5P9Y]; U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL FIREARMS OFFENDERS 4 (2019), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
research-publications/2019/20190627_Recidivism_Firearms.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2FC6-XWKC]. 
 222 Regarding the purely firearm-related element of the analysis, it is worth 
noting that Japan and the United States exist in almost antithetical realms.  In Japan, 
in 2017, there were 60 gun-related criminal incidents country-wide—with only 9 of 
them ending in fatality.  In the U.S., that same year, there were almost 11,000 
murders perpetrated with firearms, almost three quarters of the more than 15,000 
total murder-count, and this is just a measure of murder by itself, not gun violence 
comprehensively.  Focusing this particular analysis at a city level, and returning to 
New York and Tokyo, firearm presence exhibits the same traits as it does at each 
national level.  In New York, there were 1,288 victims of shootings in 2018.  In 
Tokyo, there were 0.  One would have to go back to 2015 to find an incident of gun 
violence in Tokyo, and then would only encounter two reports of robbery at 
gunpoint.  To find a gun-related murder, one would have to dig into 2014 data, a 
year in which 3 murders were perpetrated with guns in Tokyo (of the nationwide 4 
total gun murders that year).  Needless to say, with such low rates of general 
recidivism (and specific murder recidivism), in combination with the remarkably 
low national and regional gun violence and its consequent gun murder rates, the 
hot spots theory perpetrator prong is not directly applicable to the state of murder 
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Recidivism rates in the Nippon nation are statistically insignificant, 
as only five cases from 1,768 murders measured presented 
recidivism (less than 0.3%).223  Furthermore, police in both Osaka 
and Tokyo tend to arrest different individuals for every murder case 
within their jurisdictions.224  In other words, in Japan almost every 
iteration of murder is adjudicated to a different individual, 
suggesting that murder in Osaka and Tokyo, unlike in Boston, is 
perpetrated by a varying and non-cohesive group of individuals.   
In the selected U.S. cities, inequality appears heavily demarcated 
and conditioned by geodemographic factors, and subject to strict 
areal dissociation.  In Osaka and Tokyo, inequality indexes, 
unemployment, and poverty are not disproportionately 
concentrated by geographical or neighborhood delineations.  
Inequality is much less pronounced in general in the selected 
Japanese cities than in their U.S. counterparts, and it does not 
observe rigid census tract demarcations.  In examining the 
geographic and perpetrator concentration of murder in its  
relationship with socioeconomic disparity, the inter-city multi-
cultural analysis reveals that in the selected U.S. cities inequality 
concentrates in specific locations, and so does murder congregate in 
coinciding geographical spaces and perpetrator conditions; whereas 
in Japan, where inequality (i) is not as pronounced, and (ii) is not as 
geographically determined, murders occur with much less 
frequency, without areal concentration throughout the city, and 
with the absence of concentric perpetrator groups.  From the 
contrastive analysis of the state of murder and socioeconomic 
disparity in the selected U.S. and Japanese cities, it can be inferred 
that there is a relationship between geographically-demarcated 
 
in Japan.  This Paper recognizes that gun violence and its underlying firearm 
regulatory framework are structurally different in the U.S. and Japan, and that both 
could potentially be substantially effectful variables in regard to murder rates and 
police relations.  See NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN, supra note 137, at 30.  
Expanded Homicide Data Table 8:  Murder Victims by Weapon 2013-2017, FBI: UCR, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/
tables/expanded-homicide-data-table-8.xls [perma.cc/EJ89-B77Y]; Compstat 2.0, 
N.Y.P.D., https://compstat.nypdonline.org/2e5c3f4b-85c1-4635-83c6-22b27fe7c7
5c/view/89 [https://perma.cc/MP2V-NDXF] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); 
“Hasseijyokyo/Tokei” Metropolitan Police Department Crime Statistics, supra note 149. 
 223 See discussion supra Section 3.2. 
 224 In 2017, there were 99 murders in Tokyo and 98 different people arrested; 
and in Osaka 106 murders, with 103 different individuals arrested.  See discussion 
supra Sections 3.2, 3.3. 
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inequality and murder concentration—both in terms of its location 
and its perpetrators. 
The analytic component of this conclusion does not intend to 
claim that unemployment, poverty, or their derivative inequality 
necessarily produce higher murder rates.  However, it does 
conclude that, in the United States, these factors—in combination—
accompany and mirror them macro and micro-geographically.  U.S. 
historical national murder rates are volatile, and their variability 
shares a correlative path that tends to emulate (or be emulated by) 
unemployment and poverty trends; while micro-geographically 
murders tend to accumulate in areas most negatively affected by 
inequality.  In Japan, however, national trends in unemployment 
and poverty appear not to affect murder rates, which maintain a 
steady, continuous, and seemingly inexorable decline unaffected by 
cyclical socioeconomic changes—both at national and micro-
locational analytic scope.  The fact that no particular neighborhood 
seems to be specifically or disproportionately affected by inequality 
does not allow for conclusions on whether this socioeconomic 
indicator can be related to murder.  However, the exceptions to the 
inequality rule, including Nishinari in Osaka and Districts 3 and 6 
in Tokyo, suggest that, in the selected Japanese cities, socioeconomic 
indexes do not share a strict correlation with murder rates, even in 
the areas most affected by socioeconomic inequality.225  From the 
data gathered by this study, it can be inferred that lessened systemic 
 
 225 Some scholars have established that this may be due to the fact that the 
motivation for murder in Japan tends to be mainly social status or pride (except for 
the anomalous and progressively disappearing cases of organized crime), which 
contrasts sharply with Braga et al.’s characterization of murder in the U.S., which 
they determine to be heavily related to gang activity.  However, it is worth noting 
that Japan’s murder motivations are overwhelmingly based on status (constituting 
approximately 60% of murder motivations in contemporary times), business and 
money (approximately 15%), jealousy (approximately 10%), self-defense (3%).  It is 
worth noting that in post-war Japan, the people most affected by inequality were 
still overrepresented in the commission of killings.  Between 1955 and 1963, 
individuals classified as “very poor” constituted 6.25% of the general population, 
while committing 6.97% of the murders; individuals under the classification of 
“poor” constituted 25.9 of the population, while committing 61.3% of homicides; 
40.1% of the population was classified as “moderate,” and committed 30.8% of the 
murders; 20.6% of the people were categorized as “affluent” and committed 0.88% 
of homicides; and “very affluent” individuals constituted 7.15% of the general 
population, while committing 0.03% of homicides.  See Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, supra 
note 6, at 336, 338; Braga et al., supra note 2 (detailing the causes and purposes 
underlying murder in Boston and in Japan). 
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and geographically-determined socioeconomic disparity may be a 
contributing factor to lower murder rates.   
In addition to the socioeconomic differences between the United 
States and Japan, there is an additional structural divergence that 
can be found between the nations’ states of murder: the 
geographical allocation of police resources.  This difference is 
predicated upon the geolocation of the police within the city 
infrastructure, and the social consequences in functionality that 
occur as a result.  The difference between these two policy elements 
is at the heart of the proposals of this Paper: the potential 
implications for murder prevention of policies directed at (i) 
diminishing geographically-determined inequality through 
socioeconomic areal integration, and (ii) ubiquitous redistributive 
reallocation of police resources and other safety, conflict-resolution, 
and murder-preventive services, accompanied by a 
reconceptualization of their purpose.226 
Police presence is structurally different in the United States and 
Japan, as it is in the cities selected for this study.  In Boston, there are 
12 police stations.  In New York, 133 precincts.  In Osaka, there are 
649 koban, and in Tokyo 1,183.  The policy observation that this 
Paper puts forth is the following: one of the reasons Japanese police 
are so effective is their ubiquitous geographic location and insertion 
of the police into the social fabric of the communities they serve.  
This legitimizes the police force as a resource dedicated to 
community safety and conflict resolution rather than establishing 
itself as an external and intrusive force.  The  conceptualization of 
police forces is also different in both nations: Japanese police boxes 
are located every few blocks and are227 populated with three to five 
officers who are integrated members of the communities they serve.  
Not only does this seem to have high correlative values in what 
pertains to murder deterrence, but it seems that Japan falls almost 
by default into community-policing as a consequence of its inclusive 
police resource geospatial structure within the larger city 
 
 226 The high-crime micro-unit hypothesis can be utilized as a lens through 
which to focalize the effective deployment of integration and conflict-resolution 
resource reallocation policies. 
 227 See discussion supra Sections 3.2, 3.3; "Koban" in New York City?, CONSULATE 
GEN. JAPAN N.Y. (2016), https://www.ny.us.emb-japan.go.jp/japaninfo/
spring2016/04.html [https://perma.cc/ST7W-36FW] (noting that as of 2016, there 
were approximately 6,300 koban, staffed by the aforementioned average of three to 
five officers throughout Japan; as well as approximately 6,600 residential police 
boxes, usually housing one officer and their family). 
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infrastructure.  There are even police boxes spread throughout 
neighborhoods in which retired officers can gather to socialize and 
encourage community safety while being available for consultation, 
and some police stations double as homes where police officers will 
live with their families. 228   The Japanese koban model of 
structurally-integrated community policing seems able to produce 
positive consequences when compared to the United States’ police 
system in regard to murder prevention and resolution.  Murder rates 
continue decreasing and are significantly lower in Japan (below 0.3, 
compared to the United States rates presently-stabilized 5); murder 
clearance rates are almost absolute (generally around 99% in Tokyo 
and Osaka, while in New York they oscillate between 60 and 75%, 
and in Boston, they don’t reach the 50% range);229 and incarceration 
rates are significantly lower (with the United States housing the 
world’s proportionally highest prison population with 655 prisoners 
per 100,000 individuals, while Japan presents a rate of 41).230 
The question then remains, as a standing inquiry to this 
proposal: Why are the police in Japan so effective?  Is it only because 
of geographical dispersion and ubiquity?  There are several answers 
that could be utilized as counter-arguments to this thesis at a policy 
level beyond exclusively culturalist arguments: (i) Are there more 
police in Japan? (ii) Are Japanese police just better, when analyzed 
through objective elements like training, funding, or equipment?  
(iii) Are the police better paid in Japan?  The answer to these three 
questions is no. 
There are more police per capita in the United States than in 
Japan, a pattern that remains true in all of the cities analyzed in this 
study.  In 2017, the total police force in the United States was 956,941, 
with 670,279 sworn officers.  This is a rate of 339.4 officers per 
 
 228 See 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra note 150. 
 229 See NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN, supra note 137, at 8.  Clearance 
Reports (2017-2020), N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/reports-
analysis/clearance.page [https://perma.cc/5CY4-SJ5M] (last visited Apr. 24, 
2019); 2017 Tokyo Police Statistics, supra note 150; HOMICIDE UNIT, BOSTON POLICE 
DEP’T, 2017 HOMICIDE YEAR END REPORT (2017), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/5b50a07935
2f53585519bd03/1532010618077/2017+homicide+report.pdf [perma.cc/9R3Z-
8PVJ]; National Clearance Data, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/clearance-browse-by/national-data 
[https://perma.cc/62AC-AP2E]. 
 230 This Paper does not analyze the relationship between effective policing 
and incarceration.  However, it is worth noting that another crucial, structural 
difference between the United States’ and Japan’s law enforcement effects is their 
incarceration rates. 
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100,000 individuals.231  In Japan, the total police force amounts to 
296,700 law enforcement employee for a ratio of 211.54 per 100,000 
individuals—127.86 less per 100,000 or approximately 37% less total 
force than in the United States. 232   And yet, murder prevention 
effectiveness abruptly varies from below 0.3 murders per 100,000 
people in Japan to approximately 5 in the United States.  The total 
law enforcement workforce in New York was 69,592—for a rate of 
839.53 per 100,000 residents. 233  In Tokyo, the total police force was 
comprised of 43,505, for a rate of 321.78—517.75 less per 100,000 
residents, or approximately 62% less total force than New York.234  
And yet murder rates in New York have stabilized in recent years in 
rates just below 4 murders per 100,000 city inhabitants, while Tokyo 
consistently averages below 0.7.  In 2015, Boston had a total police 
force of 2,899,235 which gave the city a ratio of 435.77 officers per 
100,000 residents.  By comparison, the Osaka Prefecture had a total 
of 21,474 officers236 for 107.37 officers per 100,000 residents—328.4 
less per 100,000 residents, or approximately 25% less total force than 
 
 231 Full-time Law Enforcement Employees, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-
in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-74 [https://perma.cc/DL2B-
8F3W]. 
 232 NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN, supra note 137, at 8. 
 233 In New York, the uniformed police consist of 38,422 individuals, with a 
support group of 12,170, and a civilian workforce of 19,000.  THE COUNCIL OF THE 
CITY OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE FINANCE DIVISION ON THE FISCAL 2018 PRELIMINARY 
BUDGET AND THE FISCAL 2017 PRELIMINARY MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT FOR THE 
NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT (Mar. 14, 2017), http://council.nyc.gov/
budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2017/03/056-NYPD.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6545-83Z3]; About NYPD, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/
site/nypd/about/about-nypd/about-nypd-landing.page 
[https://perma.cc/3LPS-N5YF] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); Full-time Law 
Enforcement Employees, supra note 231. 
 234  NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN, supra note 137, at 8; STATISTICS 
BUREAU, MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMMC’NS, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF 
JAPAN (2017), https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/2017all.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QUL7-2YML]. 
 235  CITY OF BOSTON, 2015 WORKFORCE REPORT (2015), https://www.cityof
boston.gov/images_documents/2015.04.14%20Final%20Draft-UPDATED_City
%20of%20Boston%20Workforce%20Profile%20Report_tcm3-50873.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GZ63-ELNY]. 
 236 Koban Index, OSAKA PREFECTURAL POLICE, supra note 104.  See also Overview 
of Prefectural Police in 2018, IWATE PREFECTURAL POLICE, 
http://www2.pref.iwate.jp/~hp0802/oshirase/keimu/kenkeiyouran/000mokuji.
html [https://perma.cc/LZ4N-689Z].  Most of the police are gathered within Osaka 
city, though the numbers include the prefecture. 
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in Boston.  Despite Boston having a higher number of police per 
capita than Osaka, it records over 7 murders per 100,000 individuals, 
contrasted by rates that stabilize around 0.5 in the Nippon city.  In 
every possible geographical scope of the analyzed entities, there is a 
substantially larger police presence in the United States than there 
is in Japan.  It is, therefore, safe to assert that police number per 
capita is generally higher in the United States as well as in the cities 
analyzed and that the quantity of police does not equate to efficiency 
in murder prevention since increasing the number of police officers 
does not necessarily reduce murder rates. 
With respect to training and prerequisites to access the police 
profession, instruction and education preconditions are roughly 
equal in both countries.237  Regarding funding and equipment, the 
Japanese police receive substantially less dedicated funding, and do 
not have the material resources available to U.S. law enforcement.  
New York Police Department training is six months, 238  Boston’s 
almost seven months,239 and Japan’s training takes a period of six 
months.240  The recruitment prerequisites are also comparable and 
include similar levels of essential prior education.241  It is safe to 
conclude, therefore, that the quantitative elements of training as well 
as prior education requirements do not play a determinant 
 
 237  Though training time does not equate to training quality, it is not the 
purpose of this Paper to evaluate the quality of police academy training; and in the 
pursuit of avoiding potential bias towards any particular police structure, trainings 
will be assumed to have the same quality. 
 238  Hiring Process: Requirements, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/
nypd/careers/police-officers/po-hiring.page [https://perma.cc/5MA3-7S5L] 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2019). 
 239  How to Become a Police Officer, CITY BOS., https://www.boston.gov/
departments/police/how-become-police-officer [https://perma.cc/AAL3-RR3M] 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2019). 
 240  Japanese training periods are nationally mandated and regulated.  
Recruitment: Police, NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, http://www.npa.go.jp/about/
recruitment/police/school/faq.html [https://perma.cc/78HC-N6GF] (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2019). 
 241  In New York, candidates “must have earned 60 college credits with a 
minimum 2.0 GPA from an accredited institution or 2 years of active military 
service in the United States Armed Forces in order to be appointed to the title of 
Police Officer.”  In Boston, “[y]ou need to have a high school diploma or a GED 
certificate. You can also satisfy this requirement with three years of military service 
and an honorable discharge.”  In Japan both university graduates and non-
graduates can become police officers—university graduates will be trained for 6 
months, and non-graduates will be trained for 10 months.  See discussion and 
sources cited supra notes 236-240. 
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differential role in murder prevention.  Pertaining to funding, in 
2017 Japanese National Police received approximately $2.6 billion, 
and the 47 prefectural police forces received national appropriations 
of approximately $29.5 billion.242  That same year, the United States 
spent an estimated $115 billion on police, and New York City 
budgeted $5.6 billion for FY 2019—for a rate of $529 per N.Y.C. 
resident. 243   The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department 
appropriated 672,223,000,000 JPY (about $6.2 billion) in the initial 
budget of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government for Fiscal Year 
2019—for a rate of $465 per capita (approximately 14% less than 
N.Y.C. per resident).244  In 2017, the Boston Police Department was 
allocated over $356 million of the city's budget—or $528.80 per 
resident.245  The Osaka Prefectural Police Department appropriated 
273,641,000,000 JPY (about $2.5 billion) in the initial budget of the 
Osaka Prefectural Government for FY 2019—for an approximate 
rate of $327.40 per capita (61.5% less than Boston per resident).246  In 
 
 242 NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF JAPAN, supra note 137, at 11 (noting the 
yearly adjustment calculated with the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics “CPI 
Inflation Calculator”). 
 243  Police and Corrections Expenditures, URB. INST., https://www.urban.org/
policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/state-
and-local-backgrounders/police-and-corrections-expenditures 
[https://perma.cc/T6HC-7JTY]; THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE 
FINANCE DIVISION ON THE FISCAL 2019 PRELIMINARY BUDGET AND THE FISCAL 2018 
PRELIMINARY MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT FOR THE NEW YORK POLICE 
DEPARTMENT (Mar. 12, 2018), https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/
uploads/sites/54/2018/03/FY19-New-York-Police-Department.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PZP7-D5KV]. 
 244 TOKYO METRO. GOV’T, THE SUMMARY OF THE DRAFT INITIAL BUDGET OF THE 
TOKYO METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 131 (2019), 
https://www.zaimu.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/syukei1/zaisei/20190125_heisei31
nendo_tokyotoyosanangaiyou/31yosanangaiyou.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QR9-
88EP]. 
 245 This is without taking into account incidentals like overtime, which can 
amount to $60 million a year.  Other Departments like Youth Engagement & 
Employment or the Office of Arts & Culture received $6,058,544 and $1,349,436, 
respectively.  CITY OF BOSTON, SUMMARY BUDGET (2017), 
https://www.cityofboston.gov/images_documents/02%20Summary%20Budget_
tcm3-53283.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV6N-RJNF]; Walsh Declares Racism Public 
Health Crisis; Wants 20% of Boston Police OT Budget Reallocated, CBS BOSTON (June 12, 
2020), https://boston.cbslocal.com/2020/06/12/boston-police-budget-mayor-
marty-walsh/. 
 246  OSAKA PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT, THE SUMMARY OF THE DRAFT INITIAL 
BUDGET OF THE OSAKA PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 12 (2019), 
http://www.pref.osaka.lg.jp/attach/5163/00315394/shiryou1.pdf 
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terms of equipment, the militarization of the police in the United 
States has given it some of the most sophisticated and powerful tools 
available for law enforcement and urban warfare, though murder 
rate prevention results from a comparative perspective with Japan 
do not seem to accompany or reflect the expenditure.  Militarization 
of the police is a phenomenon present in the United States, but 
absent in Japan, and which does not seem to contribute positively to 
murder prevention.247 
Finally, payment and remuneration of officers does not have a 
necessary tie to the quality of law enforcement, though it is a 
question worth exploring.  Salaries of officers in both countries are 
complex to compare due to adjusted cost of living, variability 
between lower and higher rank remuneration, and the potentially 
diverging sociocultural conceptualization of money and its value.  
However, by the numbers alone, Japanese police officers seem to get 
 
[https://perma.cc/XCY2-PWJ7].  In addition, some of the expenditure of each 
prefectural police listed in Article 37, Clause 1 of the Police Act are paid from the 
budget of the Central Government.  These include the expenditure for education in 
police academies, for police telecommunications, for crime statistics, for security 
dedicated to specific locations and VIPs, for investigations of special crime, and 
other similar matters.  The itemized statement of the Budget of the Central 
Government does not distinguish the amount from the expenditure of the National 
Police Agency.  L. CRAIG PARKER JR., THE JAPANESE POLICE SYSTEM TODAY: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 32 (2001); Summary of the Restructuring 
of the Police, Circular issued from the Deputy Director General of the NPA to Chiefs 
of the Prefectural Police Headquarters, NAT’L POLICE AGENCY (March 4, 2000), 
http://www.npa.go.jp/pub_docs/index.htmS; NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, POLICE OF 
JAPAN, supra note 137, at 4-8 (detailing the prefectural, local, and national structure 
of police organization in Japan). 
 247 Police militarization may be a policy response due to a perceived need to 
compete in an “arms-race” of sorts with equally armed individuals committing 
crime, which calls into question matters of civilian firearm regulation.  See generally 
Scott W. Phillips, Police Militarization, FBI: L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/police-militarization 
[https://perma.cc/9UNC-YW3X]; Nsikan Akpan, Police Militarization Fails to 
Protect Officers and Targets Black Communities, Study Finds, PBS NEWS HOUR (Aug. 21, 
2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/police-militarization-fails-to-
protect-officers-and-targets-black-communities-study-finds 
[https://perma.cc/RU6A-8UG8]; Tom Jacobs, The Militarization of Police Does Not 
Reduce Crime, PAC. STANDARD (Aug. 20, 2018), https://psmag.com/social-
justice/militarization-of-police-does-not-reduce-crime [https://perma.cc/AXM4-
3DDF]; RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S 
POLICE FORCES (2013); MIKE DAVIS, FORTRESS LOS ANGELES: THE MILITARIZATION OF 
URBAN SPACE (2017); Sam Bieler, Police Militarization in the USA: the State of the Field, 
39 INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 586-600 (2016). 
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paid a comparatively lesser amount than law enforcement in the 
United States.248   
With significantly less total force numbers, equal quantitative 
amounts of training and formal education prerequisites, less overall 
budget, less militarized equipment, and seemingly more limited pay 
structures, murder rates in Japan remain lower than those in the 
United States.  Without any other inferences and subject to other 
socioeconomic and legal conditions, these facts appear to indicate 
higher efficiency in Japan’s murder-prevention strategies.  The key 
measurable difference between both nations’ police structures 
appears to be their geographical presence.  The solution to the 
United States murder problem could lay not in increasing the 
resources given to the police, but in geographically reorganizing the 
police more effectively to establish police presence as an integrated 
element of the communities they serve.  In doing so, there is an 
underlying social functionality that may reconceptualize the police’s 
purpose—preventing crime and building the social and 
infrastructural fabric of community-policing.249  This is not a thesis 
 
 248 In N.Y.C., officers have a starting base rate salary of $42,500 and a median 
salary after five years of $85,292.  Added with other benefits like paid vacation, 
longevity pay, night differentials and overtime, the NY.P.D. asserts officers can 
make over $100,000 per year.  In Boston, an average salary (without any of the 
compensations) amounts to $47,076.96, but some officers can make above $250,000 
or even $300,000.  Tokyo police officers receive a salary—depending on rank and 
experience—that ranges between $12,000 starting and $60,000 (164,600jpy/month-
535,400jpy/month).  Salary and Benefits, N.Y.P.D., https://www1.nyc.gov/
site/nypd/careers/police-officers/po-benefits.page [https://perma.cc/PL6B-
JCBP] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); Compensation Rates: Municipal Police Officers, 
BOSTON POLICE DEP’T, https://www.boston.gov/sites/default/files/mp2_
salplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LFK-CAFV] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); Salary 
Information for City of Boston Jobs, CITY BOS., https://www.boston.gov/
departments/human-resources/salary-information-city-boston-jobs 
[https://perma.cc/4P2D-D6DY] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019); PERS. COMM’N TOKYO 
METROPOLITAN GOV’T, PUBLIC SECURITY PERSONNEL SALARY TABLE, 
http://www.saiyou.metro.tokyo.jp/pdf/23kankoku/2312kyuuryou/23_bessi2_b
ekki/23_bekki1_02_kouan.pdf [https://perma.cc/L68Z-SLX3] (last visited Apr. 
17, 2019); Boston Detective Rakes in $400K, Other City Employees Top $300K, 
BOSTON25NEWS (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.boston25news.com/news/boston-
detective-rakes-in-400k-other-employees-top-300k-/494042149/ 
[https://perma.cc/AN7J-FAAQ]. 
 249 There are, among other disparities, infrastructural barriers to an unaltered 
implementation of the koban model in the United States.  The main infrastructural 
criticism would be that the United States tends to be less densely populated than 
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that calls for a necessary increase in resources dedicated to police 
efforts, but instead calls for a more efficient allocation of them. 
The modern iteration of the koban system appeared in 1874, 
coinciding with the creation of the Metropolitan Police Department 
as a manner in which to increase police presence at a micro-
locational level.250  Despite their prolonged history, these structural 
components of Japan’s police governance have been able to adapt 
their community purpose to the passing of the times, and appear to 
have carried significant efficiency momentum in crime and murder 
 
Japan, and that the success of the Japanese koban model would only function in 
densely-populated areas.  However, there is reason to believe the model is effective 
outside densely-populated areas.  The koban system is deployed throughout Japan 
with equal (or more) success than in Osaka and Tokyo; two cities that account for 
most of the population and murders in Japan.  This seems to indicate that the 
success of the koban model is not reliant on, or at least does not exclusively attend 
to, affectations related to population density.  Furthermore, this Paper does not 
endorse a direct transplant of the model without modification, but encourages a 
tailored adaptation accounting for divergences between the two nations.  General 
population density inside U.S. cities (about 1,600 p.mi²) is significantly greater than 
that of unincorporated areas (about 35 p.mi²); compared with the average Japanese 
average population density of almost 900 p.mi².  Though perhaps not expandable 
to the entirety of the United States, or even to every section of every city, 
infrastructural and resource distribution conclusions found in this contrastive 
study are a useful framework from which to comprehend true community-policing, 
and a preventive (and not punitive) approach to murder.  Darryl Cohen, 
Understanding Population Density, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 4, 2015), 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2015/03/
understanding-population-density.html [https://perma.cc/2D8Q-RB87]; 
DEMOGRAPHIA, DEMOGRAPHIA WORLD URBAN AREAS 23 (2020), 
http://www.demographia.com/db-worldua.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJS2-6YSW]. 
 250  “Koban,” the Japanese Policing System Spreading Across the Globe, TOKYO 
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T (2019), https://www.keishicho.metro.tokyo.jp/
smph/multilingual/english/about_us/activity/koban.html 
[https://perma.cc/LU4R-9JDW]; "Koban" in New York City?, CONSULATE GEN. 
JAPAN N.Y. (2016), https://www.ny.us.emb-japan.go.jp/japaninfo/
spring2016/04.html [https://perma.cc/ST7W-36FW]; Koban and Residential Police 
Box as a Symbol of Safe and Secure Environment of Your Community, KANAGAWA 
PREFECTURAL POLICE, https://www.police.pref.kanagawa.jp/eng/e_mes/
engg0001.htm [https://perma.cc/J2KZ-Z5YP]; Japanese Community Police and Police 
Box System, NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, http://www.npa.go.jp/english/keidai/
Guidelines_of_Police_Policy/JapaneseCommunityPolice.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/92SM-ZKD2]; Koban (Police Box), SHIZUOKA PREFECTURAL POLICE 
(Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.pref.shizuoka.jp/police/english/duty/koban.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z96Y-HTTV]; Frank Leishman, Koban: Neighbourhood Policing in 
Contemporary Japan, POLICING: J. POL’Y & PRAC. 196 (2007); Nicholas D. Kristof, A 
Neighborly Style of Police State, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 1995), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/04/weekinreview/the-world-a-neighborly-
style-of-police-state.html [https://perma.cc/UP76-T3NQ]; Tom Ellis et al., Japanese 
Community Policing Under the Microscope, in THE HANDBOOK OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
POLICING (Tom Williamson ed., 2008). 
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prevention.  The koban superstructure is projected to maintain an 
idea of permanence, integration, and trust between the community 
and the officers who serve them, and reinforces the legitimacy of the 
police and police activity within neighborhoods.  The Japanese 
National Police Agency goes as far as to name the koban “the center 
of community policing,” grounded on the concepts of cooperative 
crime prevention and deterrence.251  Its overarching purpose is to go 
beyond crime reactiveness and pursue prevention through 
integrative community-building and relationship-building.  As 
such, police interactions include, for example, conducting  jyunkai-
renraku, which are routine visits to residences and businesses, to 
listen to residents’ concerns, and take potential suggestions from 
community members with the intent of creating community 
cohesion founded on relationships of identity and trust.252  While 
under United States notions of police-relations these interactions 
with the citizenry may seem an intrusion on individual freedoms, 253 
Japan perceives this social intertwining as an advancement of 
community relations beneficial to both agents.  For the police, as 
service-providers of safety, it is a dynamic through which to 
 
 251  Japanese Community Police and Police Box System, NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, 
http://www.npa.go.jp/english/keidai/Guidelines_of_Police_Policy/JapaneseCo
mmunityPolice.pdf [https://perma.cc/92SM-ZKD2]. 
 252 Id. (noting that police sponsor community outreach activities, among other 
actions). 
 253 Though a connotation of the police ubiquity proposal put forth in this 
Paper may be that it is limiting individual freedoms, most freedom ranking 
organizations recognize that Japan guarantees very similar human and interactive 
freedoms for its citizens as the United States does.  Freedom House in its 2020 
review, gave Japan a total freedom score of 96 (with a disaggregated score of 40 in 
political rights and 56 in civil liberties), whereas the United States received a score 
of 86 (scoring 33 in political rights, and 53 in civil liberties).  According to this D.C.-
based ranking, the United States is therefore 11.63% less free than Japan.  All in all, 
it seems that the existence of (i) integrative socioeconomic policies and (ii) conflict-
resolution resource ubiquity policies in Japan does not imply in any way a 
reduction in freedoms or pursuable liberties as a consequence to its legal 
frameworks.  See Countries and Territories, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedom
house.org/countries/freedom-world/scores [https://perma.cc/9M8J-YCNW] 
(last visited June 15, 2020); SARAH REPUCCI, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 
2020: A LEADERLESS STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY (2020), https://freedomhouse.org/
sites/default/files/2020-02/FIW_2020_REPORT_BOOKLET_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G43K-EM2N].  See generally IAN VÁSQUEZ & TANJA PORČNIK, 
CATO INST., THE HUMAN FREEDOM INDEX 2019 (2019) (giving the United States a 
“personal freedoms” score of 8.72 (compared to Japan’s 8.70) and a “safety from 
homicide” score of 7.9 (2 full points below Japan’s 9.9)); “Koban” in New York City?, 
CONSULATE GEN. JAPAN N.Y. (2016), https://www.ny.us.emb-japan.go.jp/
japaninfo/spring2016/04.html [https://perma.cc/ST7W-36FW]. 
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promote community cohesion; and to individual members of the 
community, as end-users of said safety, it is a channel through 
which to see their interests addressed and guaranteed. 
As a result of this careful policy design, police officers are 
expected to become active and recognizable community members 
with deep ties connecting them to those they provide services to.  It 
appears that the underlying intent of the koban system is that of 
dispelling the conceptualization of the police force as an extraneous 
and foreign imposition of conflict-resolution and reverting it to 
deliver a user-centered service.  Despite recent local efforts in the 
United States to build community-policing structures, exemplified 
by New York’s “build the block” or “neighborhood policing” 
initiatives, there is still the fracturing element of infrastructural 
distribution of police resources standing between both nations’ 
strategies for murder prevention.  This fracture impedes U.S. police 
networks from integrating into neighborhoods in the manner that 
the koban system allows for.  It is worth noting, for the purposes of 
policy translatability, that since Singapore shifted its policing 
strategy from an incident-centered reactive system like the one 
currently present in the United States, to a police governance 
structure modelled after the koban, homicide rates have consistently 
declined on the island from around 2.5 per 100,000 individuals, to 
the current rate of 0.21.254 
Another key differential element between the United States and 
Japan, which may be tied to the integration of police into the 
communities they serve, is that of killings perpetrated by the police 
within the exercise of police powers.  Though state killings fall 
beyond the scope of this Paper, it is worthwhile to briefly address 
the potential link between community policing, the concept of 
legitimate policing, and police killings.  One of the key foundational 
principles that underlies the purpose and legitimacy of the police is 
that of maintaining peace, order, and security through the 
enforcement of law, which includes the prevention of killings.  But 
in some instances, the use of force on behalf of the state under the 
pretext of maintaining said peace concludes in the commission of a 
 
 254 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE: 
HOMICIDE TRENDS, PATTERNS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 37-38 (2019), 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3YJL-UAJS]; Ambassador of Japan to Singapore Makoto 
Yamanaka, Opening Ceremony of the International Seminar on “The Community 
Policing Strategies Evolving from the Koban System of Japan and the NPC System 
of Singapore” (Aug. 17, 2009), https://www.sg.emb-japan.go.jp/
bi_KOBNSpeech_09.htm [https://perma.cc/V34F-HBRU]. 
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killing by police officers in the line of duty.  In the United States, 
police killings generally amount to approximately 1,000 per year.255  
In Japan, police killings are near non-existent.  Official criminal 
statistics published by the National Police Agency report on 
murders committed by all public servants of national, prefectural, 
and local governments and administrations.  These include all 
individuals involved in all local and national legislative, judiciary, 
and executive bodies, including prefectural and national police 
departments.  Whereas in 2018, the United States saw approximately 
1,000 police killings, in Japan there were a total of 7 killings 
committed by all public servants.256  In 2015 Japan saw 4 killings 
perpetrated by public servants and 3 killings in 2016 and 2017; these 
patterns hold steady throughout the last decade.257  Within these 
 
 255 With the FBI reporting about 400 as justifiable homicides yearly, which in 
2019 represented 1.16 state killings per million people in New York, and 0.74 in 
Massachusetts.  Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ [https://perma.cc/RQR5-
U5W2] (last updated June 15, 2020); Expanded Homicide Data Table 5: Justifiable 
Homicide by Weapon, Law Enforcement, 2012-2016, FBI: UCR, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/tables/
expanded-homicide-data-table-5.xls [https://perma.cc/9P9E-M2Z4]. 
 256 Consultations with sources from the Japanese N.P.A. and the Ministry of 
Justice revealed that these public institutions do not publish the specific statistics of 
the number of murders by public servants broken down by administrative body or 
agency.  This prevents the public from knowing exactly the number of murders 
carried out by police officers from the government-provided statistics.  This 
information is instead inferred from private publications.  See N.P.A., Criminal 
Statistics in 2018, https://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/soubunkan/h30/h30hanza
itoukei.htm; RESEARCH GROUP ON FOREIGN SYSTEMS, Research on Safety and Police 
Activities in the United States, ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF SECURITY SCIENCE, 
Paper Series No. 96, 2017, at 5, fn. 9; RESEARCH GROUP ON FOREIGN SYSTEMS IN THE 
ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF SECURITY SCIENCE, Research on Safety and Police 
Activities in the U.S. (Association for the Study of Security Science Paper Series No. 
96, 2017), [https://perma.cc/5PRJ-63LZ]; Murder by a Handsome Macho Police 
Officer, SANKEI NEWS (Dec. 25, 2015), https://www.sankei.com/west/
news/151225/wst1512250008-n2.html [https://perma.cc/LVM5-ZLRW]; Criminal 
Statistics in 2018: Numbers of Arrested Public Servant, per Year, per Crime, NAT’L POLICE 
AGENCY, https://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/soubunkan/h30/excel/H30_130.xls 
[https:/perma.cc/X8MK-EF5G]; Criminal Statistics in 2013: Numbers of Arrested 
Public Servant, per Year, per Crime, NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, https://www.npa.go.jp/
toukei/soubunkan/h25/excel/H25_131.xls [https://perma.cc/Y2ME-JJ33]; 
Criminal Statistics in 2008: Numbers of Arrested Public Servant, per Year, per Crime, 
NAT’L POLICE AGENCY, https://www.npa.go.jp/archive/toukei/keiki/h20/
Excel/H20_132.xls [https://perma.cc/TD9M-SZ7Q]. 
 257 Police killings have occurred in 1978, 1983, 1989, 2000, 2007, 2014 (one case 
per year), and 2015, 2018 (two cases).  See 19-yr-old Police Officer Shoots Colleague 
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killings, those committed by the police in their acts of service tend 
to be zero, and are an extraordinarily rare occurrence rather than a 
norm.  Since 1978, there have only been ten total reported cases of 
killings ascribed to incumbent police officers and the majority of 
them appear to not have been in the line of duty. 258   Far from 
idealizing a direct translation of the koban system to the United 
States, what seems undeniable is that the United States’ police 
structure, which may have been useful as a policy answer to a 
different time in which law enforcement needed congregative 
militarized structures for the administration of “law and order,” 
now seems to have exhausted its applicability under the same 
patterns and poses a set of challenges both for citizen and officer.  
The koban integrated model appears to suggest that if police 
resources are deployed more precisely and equitably, they can 
function more efficiently as a murder-inhibiting agent.  It can be 
derived from this comparative analysis that the potential of the 
police as a force for murder prevention and community-building 
can be more effectively utilized if conflict-resolution dynamics are 
designed to be integrated within our communities like they are in 
Japan by way of the koban system.  It may be complex for citizens to 
ascribe legitimacy to a militarized police force constituted by 
individuals that do not belong to the community they serve just as 
it may be complex for the police officers to maintain order and 
justice.  This Paper does not intend to suggest that a koban-style 
approach to geographical allocation of police resources would imply 
an amelioration of this critical situation in the United States. 259  
However, it is worth noting that Japan, a country which pursues 
permanent police presence by way of the koban model has 
significantly less state killings than the United States, where (i) the 
 
Dead in Western Japan, KYODO NEWS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://english.
kyodonews.net/news/2018/04/f9b192050330-police-officer-shot-dead-possibly-
by-missing-colleague.html [https://perma.cc/J74R-Y4TG]; Police Officer in Koban 
Stabbed to Death in Sendai; Attacker Shot Dead, JAPAN TODAY (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://japantoday.com/category/crime/police-officer-in-koban-stabbed-to-
death-in-sendai-attacker-shot-dead.  See also Murder by a Handsome Macho Police 
Officer, supra note 256; Criminal Statistics in 2018: Numbers of Arrested Public Servant, 
per Year, per Crime, supra note 256. 
 258 See generally sources cited supra notes 256, 257. 
 259 As previously stated, the indicator of police killings may be closely tied to 
the effects of community policing on police forces and the neighborhoods they 
pursue their state functions in.  However, this Paper is deferential with the 
determinism of this connection, and does not make absolute claims regarding its 
certainty, as it recognizes that it may be linked to other complex, overlapping, and 
nuanced sociocultural and socioeconomic factors, bases, and inferences. 
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geo-allocation of police resources may create a dislodging rift 
between law enforcement and the citizens they serve, and (ii) where 
socioeconomic divides amongst neighborhoods are more 
pronounced.  Perhaps, as a consequence to a koban-style mode of 
policing, people would cease to see a division between the police 
and the community and see law enforcement as members of the 
community providing the service of safety as they do in Japan.  
This Paper does not call for a direct emulation of the koban 
system, regardless of whether this is a model that has had 
objectively positive results in Japan.  This Paper instead proposes 
that it is the underlying principles of the koban system that make for 
an efficient crime prevention strategy in general, and a targeted 
murder prevention strategy specifically.  This latent essence is found 
in the integration and identity between social and legal norms 
necessary for maintaining stability and peace across communities, 
and those individuals who provide the service of their enforcement.  
In subscribing to the nature of these systems, this Paper proposes 
the pursuit of a redistribution of the conceptualization of law 
enforcement power dynamics and criminal retribution.  It proposes 
a reimagining of social conflict resolution at a micro-level that 
reconstructs systems of post-criminal punitive action, replacing 
them with systems of preventive, community-centered, and 
integrated justice distribution.  Perhaps this may take the form of a 
koban system adopted in Japan, where police officers are active, 
integrated, and identifiable actors within their community.  Or 
perhaps it may take the form of local social councils directed at 
restorative justice rather than punitive retribution, as an aprioristic 
measure to the involvement of the traditional justice system; paired 
with a tightening of the reins of accountability regarding abuses of 
authority, and a reconceptualization of social services as murder 
prevention strategies.  Or perhaps it is a combination of all these 
policies or their interlacing with other systemic alternatives—
always anchored to become an effective and culturally-adapted 
conversion of a redistribution and reconstruction of power nuclei 
between the police and the citizenry.  In essence, the system to cure 
the present inefficiencies of U.S. police dynamics may be inspired by 
the principles of redistribution of justice administration and peace-
keeping resources to ensure non-arbitrary and non-violent results 
and allow communities to feel like the order system is established 
for and by its citizens, integrated within their communities, and not 
an application of extraneous foreign force which may carry with it 
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the implied risk of ending in death.  This is fundamentally what the 
koban system provides to the Japanese society: an equal and 
disperse distribution of community-focused resources which 
concludes in the social integration of the administration of justice 
and order, and the provision of safety as a community resource.  The 
koban system, as other analogous community-focused and 
integrated peace-keeping systems do, allows for social conflict 
resolution to occur prior to the criminal conduct through the 
creation of tight-knit and cohesive social structures interwoven with 
their safety-enforcement systems.  This may be a fundamental pillar 
of the Japanese success at criminal deterrence and an integral 
component to its comparative efficiency at preventing murder.   
This Paper does not intend to establish the claim that community 
policing would cure all the inefficiencies and complexities endemic 
to the U.S. police system.  Nonetheless, it is a path forward, and a 
positive start to a conversation that regards safety as a community 
service.  Reformulating murder as a public goods issue pushes us to 
understand communities as consumers of safety and the police as 
due providers of said safety.  Integrated relations would benefit 
community members as the “end-user” of safety, as well as those 
who are to provide and distribute the public service.  As consumers 
and financiers of the safety public good, communities have the right 
to redesign and redefine the nature of the product provided to them.  
As far as taxpayers invest in peace-keeping services for the purpose 
of social safety as the foundational legitimating principle of the 
police force, this includes the reasonable prevention of killings.  
Taxpayers thus deserve that their contributions to capitalizing the 
police are transparent and that the peace services provided are as 
efficient, accountable in their execution, and consumer-focused as 
they can be.  In Japan this is achieved with less human capital and 
less dedicated monetary resources, resulting in less murders by way 
of the koban system.  Japan has almost 40% less law enforcement 
employees per capita than the United States, their murder clearance 
rates are higher by an almost 40% differential (and near-absolute), 
and murder rates in the Nippon nation are 26.5 times smaller.  These 
facts perhaps dispel the notion that more capital investment and 
more police necessarily equate more safety from murder.  This 
information also pushes us to look deeper into the foundational 
principles of our police forces as well as the socioeconomic causality 
of homicide, and question how to formulate systems that may more 
efficiently prevent murder. 
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Japan has uncovered a competitive advantage over other nations 
in murder prevention and resolution.  Though the underlying 
causes for the country’s success at almost eradicating murder may 
be deeply rooted in culturally-charged values, those are complex to 
model and transplant to other nations.  Cultural deontology cannot 
easily be observed, removed, and adapted from one society to 
another.  However, it is possible to emulate techniques of success 
and, in that regard, follow in the footsteps of Japan’s address of 
murder as a social issue.  This Paper does not propose a direct and 
universal transplant of Japan’s policies into the United States.  
Instead it acknowledges that there are lessons to be learned in the 
principles that inform and inspire them.  This Paper proposes an 
adaptation of the notions derived from Japan’s success in murder 
prevention, and encourages the pursuit of reform in United States 
regulatory framework attending to U.S.’ capacities and necessities, 
without sacrificing fundamental American freedoms and liberties.260  
This could be achieved in the United States by (i) enacting policies 
that seek to reduce and disassociate socioeconomic inequality from 
strict geospatial demarcations, and (ii) reallocating police and other 
safety and conflict-resolution resources to make them universally 
available, socially integrated, and community-focused in the style of 
the koban.  
 
 260 See discussion supra note 253. 
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